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Fragmented Lives: Disability Discrimination 
and the Role of "Environment-Framing" 
Ani B. Satz* 
Abstract 
This Article presents a novel theory that courts undermine the purpose 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by implicitly embracing 
environment-frames that disfavor disability protections. Courts employ 
environment-frames at two stages of judicial analysis under the Act: the 
disability eligibility and remedy stages. In determining whether a plaintiff 
is in the statutorily protected class, courts typically use a broad 
environment-frame to assess limitation of a "major life activity." The 
larger the environment-frame, the more likely a court will view an 
individual as able to perform a major life activity in some portion of her 
environment and deny her protected class status. By contrast, in the 
remedy context courts use narrow environment-frames. The smaller the 
environment-frame (e.g., a cubicle workspace rather than an office 
building), the greater the likelihood a court will perceive an individual as 
functional and deny her reasonable accommodation or other modification. 
Environment-frames thus fragment the human experience of disability, by 
creating a disconnection between the lived and the legally recognized 
aspects of disability. The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (AAA), fails to 
address these problems. The AAA broadens the definition of disability, but 
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it does not examine or change the environments in which courts assess an 
individual’s ability to function. 
I propose a two-part solution to address the problems of environment-
framing. First, courts must adopt broad environment-frames for both 
eligibility and remedy purposes. To determine eligibility, courts should 
assess individuals with functional impairments in a broad environment that 
includes workplace, home, and other environments in the civic and social 
realms. 	Similarly, individuals requesting accommodation or other 
modification should have their claims assessed within a broad environment 
that captures the nature of what they are trying to access, e.g., a place of 
employment rather than an office space. Second, courts must interpret an 
individual’s ability to function in a more holistic or complete manner by 
gaining a better understanding of the effects of impairment throughout a 
broad environment. To ensure that the ability to function in some portion 
of a broad environment does not undermine disability status, I suggest a 
method of assessment similar to the one employed in Social Security 
disability benefits cases. Despite the Social Security Act’s relatively 
restrictive definition of disability, courts employ a more favorable 
assessment of a broad environment that does not limit eligibility for benefits 
in most cases. A holistic view of functioning within a broad environment 
would also afford more meaningful reasonable accommodation or other 
modification. 
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I. Introduction 
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)1  prohibits 
disability discrimination as a matter of civil right for those who qualify as 
disabled.2  For almost two decades after the passage of the ADA, 
membership in the disability protected class was restricted by U.S. Supreme 
Court jurisprudence.3  The Court narrowly interpreted two components of 
1. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006), 
amended by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 
[hereinafter ADA] (providing protection against discrimination for individuals with 
disabilities). 
2. See id. § 12101 (mandating the "elimination of discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities"). 
3. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 201 (2002) (finding 
that a factory worker who could not perform "‘repetitive work with hands and arms extended 
at or above shoulder levels for extended periods of time’" but who was able to complete a 
number of household tasks may not be "substantially limited" in the major life activity of 
performing manual tasks (quoting Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 224 F.3d 840, 
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the disability threshold test, namely, whether a physical or mental 
impairment "substantially limits"4  a "major life activity."5  In 2008, 
Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act (AAA),6  which seeks to 
broaden the class of individuals protected under the ADA.7  The Act lowers 
the burden for proving a "substantial limitation,"8  broadens the concept of 
"major life activities,"9  and assesses an individual’s impairment before the 
benefits of drugs, assistive devices, or other mitigation.10 
While the AAA increases protection for individuals with disabilities 
by broadening eligibility for the protected class, it does not address the 
relevant environment in which to assess impairments.11 	Judicial 
construction of an unfavorable environment may undermine protections.12 
For example, if an assembly line employee with a functional limitation 
affecting her work is assessed for her ability to perform manual tasks at 
both home and work, she may be able to function in some portion of her 
843 (6th Cir. 2000))); see also Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 492–93 (1999) 
(finding that twin sister pilots with severe myopia were not "substantially limited" in any 
major life activity or "regarded as" so limited in the major life activity of working); 
Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566 (1999) (finding that a truck driver with 
monocular vision was not "substantially limited" in the major life activity of seeing); 
Murphy v. UPS, 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999) (finding that a mechanic with severe hypertension 
was not "substantially limited" in any major life activity or "regarded as" so limited in the 
major life activity of working). 
4. See Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 198 ("[T]o be substantially limited in 
performing manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely 
restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s 
daily lives."). 
5. See id. at 197 ("‘Major life activities’ . . . refers to those activities that are of 
central importance to daily life."). 
6. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006)) [hereinafter AAA] (restoring the "intent and 
protections" of the ADA). 
7. See id. § 2(b)(1), 122 Stat. at 3554 (describing one of the purposes of the AAA as 
"reinstating a broad scope of protection" under the ADA). 
8. See id. § 2(b)(4)–(6), 122 Stat. at 3554 (noting Supreme Court decisions restricting 
eligibility for disability protections under the ADA). 
9. See id. § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555–56 (providing examples of "major life activities"). 
10. See id. (assessing impairment without considering the effects of mitigating 
measures). The AAA does not address remedies for disability discrimination or the nature 
of remedies—areas of disability rights analysis that will likely receive greater attention as a 
larger number of individuals qualify as disabled under the ADA. 
11. See id. (amending the definition of "disabled" but not addressing the issue of the 
environment in which disability is to be assessed). 
12. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 201 (2002) 
(considering a home and work environment for a workplace discrimination claim). 
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home environment and not be considered disabled.13  If she is assessed only 
in her workplace environment, however, she may be viewed as disabled. 
Broad understanding of "substantially limits" and "major life activities" 
cannot overcome this issue of environment selection. Thus, no matter how 
expansive the definition of "disability" is under the AAA,14  individuals may 
be assessed in an environment that disfavors or denies them protected class 
membership. 
Courts also use unfavorable environments in the remedy context, 
which the AAA does not address. At this stage of disability analysis, courts 
assess individuals in narrow environments, often denying accommodation 
or other modification.15  In this situation, an individual who is viewed as 
able to function in a portion of her environment, such as an office cubicle, 
may not receive accommodation to access other areas of the workplace, like 
break or copy rooms. 
Thus, the environments in which the effects of impairments are 
assessed for purposes of disability protections are significant because they 
determine judicial outcomes. My analysis of federal case law reveals that 
the environments used by most courts limit disability protections at two 
discrete stages: the disability threshold (eligibility) and remedy stages. 
Under the disability threshold test, courts typically assume a broad 
environment-frame, and an individual who is able to function in some 
portion of her environment is not considered disabled.16  When determining 
whether a plaintiff with a disability is entitled to a remedy, however, courts 
adopt a narrow environment-frame that limits or denies accommodation or 
other modification.17  Thus, at both ends of judicial analysis—eligibility for 
the protected class and remedy—tacit judicial framing undercuts disability 
civil rights protections. This fragments the human experience of living with 
disability, as one’s actual experience differs from the legally recognized 
one.18 	Courts exclude from the protected class individuals with 
13. These are the basic facts of Toyota. Id. While the AAA rejects several aspects of 
Toyota, it does not directly address the environment-frame to be assessed. Infra note 55 and 
accompanying text. The AAA clarifies that an individual needs to have a substantial 
limitation in only one major life activity, but does not speak to the environment in which to 
assess it. AAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555–56 (2008) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 12102 (2006)). 
14. See AAA § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555–56 (noting that the definition of disability 
should be "construed in favor of broad coverage"). 
15. Infra Part III. 
16. Infra Part II. 
17. Infra Part III. 
18. I develop my theory of fragmentation and discuss its implications for individuals 
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impairments who identify as disabled and deny accommodation or other 
modification to individuals with impairments who request it to function. It 
is worth emphasizing that courts could choose a large or small environment 
for disability analysis, but instead they frame environments broadly at one 
stage and narrowly at the other, resulting in the denial of most claims. 
The U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal courts have not addressed 
directly the relevant environments for assessing disability eligibility or 
remedy. Since the passage of the ADA, courts have assessed disability and 
remedy within environments determined on an ad hoc basis.19  Courts have 
not discussed why environments are framed in certain ways, and have 
framed environments inconsistently.20 
This Article is the first to develop a theory of "environment-framing" 
in disability law and to discuss the importance of environment-frames for 
disability protections.21  I use "environment-frames" to mean the physical 
spaces in which individuals are assessed for legal protection.22 
with impairments in Ani B. Satz, Overcoming Fragmentation in Disability and Health Law, 
60 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2011) [hereinafter Overcoming Fragmentation]. 
"Environment-framing" is discussed as "micro-level fragmentation" in that article, as it 
occurs at the level of judicial interpretation of statutes—rather than as a result of plain 
language of laws and regulations—which I argue results in "macro-level fragmentation." Id. 
19. See infra Parts II and III (showing how courts have utilized environment-frames in 
disability cases). 
20. See infra Parts II and III (showing the varying ways in which courts have utilized 
environment-frames). 
21. See infra Parts II and III (discussing environment-framing in relation to 
establishing disability and determining remedy). 
22. The term "framing" is used by Mark Kelman to discuss temporal boundaries for 
viewing criminal conduct and by Daryl Levinson to define transactions in constitutional law. 
See generally Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 
STAN. L. REV. 591 (1981); Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 
111 YALE L.J. 1311 (2002). Levinson argues that frames in constitutional law should not 
"creat[e] or negat[e] individualized harm, but instead . . . direct judicial attention to the types 
and patterns of government behavior that are significant for purposes of implementing 
particular constitutional norms." Id. at 1317. My use of "frame" is only loosely related to 
either Kelman’s or Levinson’s construction. While I use "frame" to mean a boundary, my 
concept differs in nature and scope. I am concerned only with physical spaces and 
individual (though holistic) assessment. 
"Frames" are also used in the social sciences—including computer science, 
environmental science, and behavioral economics—to discuss boundaries. I do not intend to 
invoke those meanings in this Article, though interesting insights might be gained from 
interdisciplinary work on frames. As Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler argue in Nudge, for 
example, studies in behavioral economics indicate our choices are affected by subtle 
persuasion or "choice architecture" within our environment. See generally RICHARD H. 
THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND 
HAPPINESS (2008). The effect of this, if any, on lawyering strategy or legal outcomes might 
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Constructing a frame broadly may allow for a holistic or more complete 
consideration of an individual’s functional capacities, though functioning in 
any part of a broad environment could be viewed as reason to disallow a 
disability claim. Conversely, a narrow environment-frame provides a 
snapshot view of an individual’s ability to function and may not capture the 
degree of a functional impairment or the extent to which accommodation or 
other modification is needed. 
After developing a theory of environment-framing,23  this Article offers 
a two-part solution to address the problems of such framing.24  Both of my 
proposals entail a change in judicial construction of the ADA, rather than 
further amendment to the statute.25  First, I suggest that courts should use 
broad environment-frames for both eligibility and remedy purposes. Courts 
should assess an individual with functional impairments in a broad 
environment that includes workplace, home, and other relevant 
environments in the civic and social realms. At the eligibility stage, this 
will entail the continued use of a broad frame, though, as I explain below, a 
change in judicial interpretation of that frame. At the remedy stage, this 
will require courts to shift from a narrow to a broad environment-frame. 
Second, courts should interpret an individual’s ability to function in a 
more holistic or complete manner by gaining a better understanding of the 
effects of impairment throughout a broad environment. While most courts 
currently employ a broad environment-frame for disability eligibility 
purposes under the ADA, they assess that environment in a manner that 
results in unwarranted conclusions about an individual’s functional 
impairments. Courts currently view an individual’s ability to function in a 
portion of her life as almost dispositive evidence against disability.26  Such 
evidence of functioning is relevant to, but must not be determinative of, 
eligibility for the protected class.27  While the AAA broadens the definition 
of disability and specifies that an individual must have a substantial 
limitation of only one major life activity, it does not directly address the 
relevant environment in which to assess the effects of impairment or the 
method for doing so.28  To ensure that the ability to function in some 
be an area for future work. 
23. Infra Parts II and III. 
24. Infra Part V. 
25. Infra Part V. 
26. Infra Part II. 
27. Infra Part V. 
28. Infra Part IV. 
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portion of a broad environment does not undermine disability status, I 
suggest a method of assessment similar to the one employed in Social 
Security disability benefits cases.29  Despite the Social Security Act’s 
relatively restrictive definition of disability, courts employ a more favorable 
assessment of a broad environment that does not limit eligibility for 
benefits in most cases.30  Similarly, at the remedy stage, claims for 
accommodation or other modification should be considered within an 
environment broad enough to afford meaningful access. 
This Article is divided into five parts following the Introduction. Part 
II explores the role of environment-framing in federal disability protected 
class litigation. I argue that the broader the environment-frame used, the 
less likely an individual will be deemed eligible for disability protections. 
This Part focuses on litigation addressing "substantial limitation of a major 
life activity."31  I explore the cases that pertain to the major life activity of 
"working" in detail, since they serve as an excellent example of the 
spectrum of environment-frames adopted by federal courts determining 
eligibility. Part III discusses environment-framing and remedy. The 
narrower the environment-frame chosen in this context, the less likely an 
individual will receive an accommodation or other modification. In this 
Part, I focus on litigation about prison and jail modification because it 
provides perhaps the best example of the many ways in which 
environments may be framed for remedy purposes, even within a finite, 
clearly defined space. Part IV discusses the ADA Amendments Act of 
2008,32  its potential weaknesses for addressing environment-framing, and 
the possibility that constructing environment-frames in a certain manner 
could undermine the Act’s purpose to expand protected class membership. 
Part V explores the holistic, aggregative method of assessing disability in 
Social Security benefits cases as a means to interpret environment-frames. 
The Social Security Administration and reviewing courts assess 
individuals’ functioning across the environments in which they move, 
rather than in discrete situations.33  Unlike in the ADA context, however, 
29. Infra Part V.A. 
30. Infra Part V.A; see also infra note 303 (citing Grizzle v. Macon Cnty., in which the 
individual qualified for Social Security benefits but not for disability benefits under the 
ADA). 
31. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2006) (defining a disability as "a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such 
individual"). 
32. AAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555–56 (2008) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 12102 (2006)). 
33. Infra Part V.A.2. 
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functioning in a portion of a broad environment does not preclude disability 
status. I argue in this Part that courts should adopt a version of this method 
of environment-frame assessment for eligibility and remedy purposes under 
the ADA. Part VI concludes the Article by considering why courts 
currently frame environments as they do under the ADA, with trends 
toward broad frames for disability eligibility assessment and small frames 
for remedy analysis. I suggest that judicial use of these environment-
frames may be the result of an unfunded civil rights mandate that provides 
for reasonable accommodation or other modification.34 
II. Environment-Framing and Protected Class 
Courts frame environments on an ad hoc basis when assessing 
individuals under established statutory tests for eligibility for disability 
protections.35  The relevant tests include whether an individual has a 
"mental or physical impairment"36  and also whether that impairment 
"substantially limits" a "major life activity."37  Judicial trends indicate that 
the broader the environment-frame, the more likely an individual will be 
perceived as functional within it and denied membership in the disability 
class.38  Typically this phenomenon is not an issue with respect to the 
"physical or mental impairment" component of the disability threshold test 
because most courts turn to perhaps the smallest environment-frame—one’s 
own body—and recognize an impairment.39  Judicial frames for "major life 
34. See infra note 233 (discussing "unfunded mandate"). 
35. Infra Part II. 
36. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). 
37. Id. The ADA also covers individuals with "a record of such an impairment" or 
who are "regarded as having such an impairment." Id. § 12102(1)(B)–(C). Individuals with 
a record of a disability must prove that the record is for a disability that meets the 
requirements for actual disability. Id. Thus, the arguments about environment-framing in 
this Part apply to the "record" prong as well. After the AAA, "regarded as" plaintiffs are no 
longer required to meet the standard for actual disability, so environment-frames are less 
likely to play a role in "regarded as" cases. AAA § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555–56. Plaintiffs are 
not entitled to accommodation for "regarded as" discrimination under the AAA, however. 
Id. 
38. Infra Part II. 
39. For example, a "physical or mental impairment" has been an issue in only one of 
the over twenty U.S. Supreme Court cases decided under the ADA. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 
524 U.S. 624, 637 (1998) (holding that HIV, which affects an individual’s CD4+ [white cell] 
counts, constitutes a "physical impairment"). In Bragdon, the Court deemed the relevant 
environment-frame to be the cells within one’s own body, and held that the plaintiff was 
disabled. Id. 
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activities," however, tend to be broad.40  In many "major life activity" cases, 
large environment-frames preclude membership in the protected class.41  
This Part is divided into two subparts. Subpart A provides a brief 
overview of trends in litigation about "major life activities."42  Subpart B 
provides a detailed discussion of the use of environment-frames for the 
major life activity of "working."43  I emphasize "working" because courts 
employ a spectrum of environments to assess limitation of this major life 
activity. Further, it is the only major life activity that the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations directly 
acknowledge requires courts to determine environment-frames or 
"geographical areas."44  Statutory and regulatory guidance regarding how to 
frame environments for "working" is lacking, however, and even in this 
context courts often do so in an ad hoc manner.45  
A. "Major Life Activity" 
The ADA covers a broad range of "major life activities," including 
"caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, 
sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, 
reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, [] working," and "major 
bodily functions."46  Courts consider a "substantial limitation" of a major 
life activity by assessing an individual’s ability to function within a 
particular physical space.47  This space constitutes the "environment-frame" 
40. Infra Part II. 
41. Infra Part II. 
42. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2006) (requiring "substantial limitation" in 
"one or more major life activities" to establish disability). 
43. AAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555–56 (2008) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 12102 (2006)) (listing "working" as a major life activity). 
44. See Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA, 29 
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(A) (2010) (listing "geographical area" as a relevant consideration 
for the major life activity of "working"); see also ADA § 12102(1)(A) (defining disability as 
an impairment that "substantially limits" a major life activity). 
45. Infra Part II.B. 
46. ADA § 12102(2)(A). "Major bodily functions" are defined as "including, but not 
limited to, functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, 
neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions." Id. 
§ 12102(2)(B). 
47. See id. § 12111(9) (discussing reasonable accommodation); §§ 12142, 12143(a), 
12144, 12146, 12147, 12182(b)(2)(B)–(C), 12184(a)–(b) (discussing transportation); 
§§ 12182(a)–(b), 12183 (discussing public accommodation). 
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in which courts measure an individual’s functional abilities. Except for 
some limited guidance with respect to the major life activity of "working," 
the ADA and supporting regulations do not address the environment-frames 
courts should use to assess an individual.48  Courts also do not explicitly 
discuss environment-frames outside the major life activity of "working," 
though they expand or contract the frames implicitly used with respect to 
other major life activities to recognize or deny protected class status.49 
Courts employ a spectrum of environment-frames. Cases in which 
narrow environment-frames are used typically involve frames of a 
workplace or a specific place of public service or accommodation.50  Courts 
adopting broad frames most often consider an environment of both an 
individual’s home and workplace, or society in general.51  Of course one’s 
home and workplace environments are also subject to interpretation, and 
these environments may be narrowly or broadly construed as well, which 
adds another layer of complexity to understanding environment-frames.52 
An analysis of federal cases reveals two trends. First, typically the 
larger the environment-frame used by a court, the more likely an individual 
will be able to perform a major life activity in some portion of her 
environment and will be denied protected class status.53  This may seem 
48. See 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B)–(C) (stating the need to assess the 
"geographical area"). 
49. See infra Part IV (discussing how, despite the AAA, courts may continue to 
construct environment-frames to deny eligibility for disability protections). 
50. See, e.g., Adams v. Rice, 531 F.3d 936, 949 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (using an 
environment-frame of the workplace); Gribben v. UPS, 528 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(same); Chalfant v. Titan Distribution, Inc., 475 F.3d 982, 989 (8th Cir. 2007) (same). 
51. See, e.g., Simpson v. Ala. Dep’t of Human Res., 311 F. App’x 264, 268 (11th Cir. 
2009) (using an environment-frame of society); Fikes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 322 F. App’x 882, 
884 (11th Cir. 2009) (using an environment-frame of home and work); Lord v. Arizona, 286 
F. App’x 364, 365–66 (9th Cir. 2008) (same); Gruener v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 510 F.3d 661, 
664–65 (6th Cir. 2008) (same); Singh v. George Wash. Univ. Sch. of Med. & Health Sci., 
508 F.3d 1097, 1103–04 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (using an environment-frame of society); Rolland 
v. Potter, 492 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2007) (using an environment-frame of home and work); 
Ashton v. AT&T Co., 225 F. App’x 61, 67 (3d Cir. 2007) (same); Hill v. Steven Motors, 
Inc., 97 F. App’x 267, 276 (10th Cir. 2004) (using an environment-frame of spaces in which 
plaintiff learned and moved). 
52. Infra Part II.B. 
53. Compare Fikes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 322 F. App’x 882, 884 (11th Cir. 2009) (using a 
broad environment-frame and finding that plaintiff was not substantially limited in a major 
life activity), Lord v. Arizona, 286 F. App’x 364, 365–66 (9th Cir. 2008) (same), Gruener v. 
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 510 F3d 661, 664–65 (6th Cir. 2008) (same), Singh v. George Wash. 
Univ. Sch. of Med. & Health Sci., 508 F.3d 1097, 1103–04 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (same), Rolland 
v. Potter, 492 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2007) (same), Ashton v. AT&T Co., 225 F. App’x 61, 67 
(3d Cir. 2007) (same), and Hill v. Steven Motors, Inc., 97 F. App’x 267, 276 (10th Cir. 
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counter-intuitive, since one might think that the broader the frame, the more 
likely one could find a substantial limitation of a major life activity 
somewhere in the environment. However, the cases reveal courts reach the 
opposite conclusion at the eligibility stage. The second trend is that few 
courts employ narrow frames at the eligibility stage. This may indicate that 
courts either view broad frames as better for assessing functional capacities 
(a proposition rejected in Part III), or that environment-framing plays a role 
in restricting protected class membership. 
The most notable example of a court constructing an environment-
frame broadly and finding that the plaintiff was not disabled is Toyota 
Motor Manufacturing v. Williams.54  While the AAA overturns the test for 
"substantially limits" developed in Toyota and specifies that an individual 
needs to be substantially limited in only one major life activity, the Act 
does not speak to the environment-frame used in the case.55  In Toyota, an 
individual with severe carpal tunnel syndrome who alleged limitation of the 
major life activity of "performing manual tasks" was assessed in both her 
home and workplace environments.56  The U.S. Supreme Court overturned 
the lower court’s partial grant of summary judgment for the plaintiff 
because the Court found that the plaintiff’s ability to complete some vital 
household manual tasks raised a genuine issue of material fact about her 
disability status.57  Numerous other federal decisions deny protected class 
status using the same environment-frame.58  While the AAA lowers the 
2004) (same), with Adams v. Rice, 531 F.3d 936, 949 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (using a narrow 
environment-frame and finding that plaintiff was substantially impaired in a major life 
activity), Gribben v. UPS, 528 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2008) (same), and Chalfant v. Titan 
Distribution, Inc., 475 F.3d 982, 989 (8th Cir. 2007) (same). 
The proposed EEOC regulations seem to recognize the difficulty, though they extend 
beyond the statute: "In determining whether an individual has a disability, the focus is on 
how a major life activity is substantially limited, not on what an individual can do in spite of 
an impairment." Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA, 
74 Fed. Reg. 48431, 48440 (proposed Sept. 23, 2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630). 
The example provided involves a student with a learning disability who "has achieved a high 
level of academic success, such as graduating from college." Id. at 48442. The example 
continues, "[t]he determination of whether an individual has a disability does not depend on 
what an individual is able to do in spite of an impairment." Id. 
54. See Toyota Motor Mfg. Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 200–02 (2002) 
(finding that a factory worker who could perform some household manual tasks may not be 
"substantially limited" in the major life activity of performing manual tasks). 
55. AAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, §§ 2(b)(4)–(5), 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554, 3555–56 
(2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, 12102 (2006)). 
56. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 200–02. 
57. Id. at 200–03. 
58. See generally Fikes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., No. 97-2897, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 7669 
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threshold for demonstrating a "substantial limitation," an individual may 
still be assessed in a broad environment and denied disability status if she is 
able to function in some portion of it. As Part IV discusses, litigation after 
the AAA indicates that the method for assessing broad environment-frames 
will not change. 
Many disability eligibility cases involve the major life activity of 
"working." 	The next subpart provides a detailed examination of 
environment-framing in this area. 
B. "Working" and Geography 
The major life activity of "working"59  is the one area where courts 
have acknowledged the need to frame an environment for disability 
analysis, though little agreement exists about how to do so. As of this 
writing, only one case involving the major life activity of "working" has 
been decided directly under the AAA, and the court did not discuss the 
requirements for establishing limitation of the major life activity.60  Prior to 
the AAA, EEOC regulations stated that to be "substantially limited" in 
"working," an individual was required to demonstrate that her impairment 
prevented her from participating in a "class of jobs or broad range of jobs in 
various classes as compared to the average person having comparable 
training, skills and abilities."61  A "class of jobs" was "the number and types 
(11th Cir. Apr. 10, 2009) (using an environment-frame of home and work); Lord v. Arizona, 
286 F. App’x 364 (9th Cir. 2008) (same); Lloyd v. Wash. & Jefferson Coll., 288 F. App’x 
786 (3d Cir. 2008) (same); Gruener v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 510 F.3d 661 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(same); Berry v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 490 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2007) (same); Rolland v. 
Potter, 492 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2007) (same); Ashton v. AT&T Co., 225 F. App’x 61 (3d Cir. 
2007) (same); Carruthers v. BSA Adver., Inc., 357 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2004) (same). 
59. The AAA lists "working" as a major life activity. AAA § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555– 
56. While the Supreme Court has not recognized "working" as a major life activity, it was 
widely viewed as a major life activity by the lower federal courts. See Sutton v. United Air 
Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491–92 (1999) ("Because the parties accept that the term ‘major 
life activities’ includes working, we do not determine the validity of the cited regulations."). 
60. See Wurzel v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 3:09CV498, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36635, at 
*20 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 2010) (involving an individual who was "regarded as" disabled). 
Since after the AAA it is no longer necessary for a "regarded as" plaintiff to show a 
perception of a substantial limitation of a major life activity, the court in Wurzel did not 
discuss the degree of plaintiff’s limitation in "working." 
61. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA, 29 
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2010); see also Fournier v. Payco Foods Corp., 611 F. Supp. 2d 
120, 131 (D.P.R. 2009) (requiring a "multi-level analysis, starting with the skills of plaintiff, 
and moving to the nature of the jobs [he] was prevented from performing as well as those 
[he] was not"). 
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of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within [the 
employee’s] geographical area."62  A "broad range of jobs" was "the 
number and types of other jobs not utilizing similar training, knowledge, 
skills or abilities, within [the employee’s] geographical area."63  The 
"geographical area" was viewed as that "to which the individual has 
reasonable access."64  Lack of further statutory or regulatory guidance about 
how to frame the relevant geographic environment resulted in courts 
utilizing a range of environments, from a specific department of a company 
to any job in the national economy. 
Cases indicate that typically the broader the environment-frame, the 
less likely an individual will be recognized as impaired in the major life 
activity of "working."65  This is because one will be perceived as able to 
work in some portion of the designated environment, and thus as not 
disabled. Further, a broad environment-frame poses a high evidentiary 
burden for plaintiffs who may not have documentation of limitations 
beyond a particular workplace. Exceptions to broad frames limiting 
eligibility under the major life activity of "working" only arise in cases of 
egregious employer conduct.66 
This Subpart discusses the various environments adopted by courts 
with respect to "class of jobs" and "broad range of jobs." While some 
courts address geography more directly than others, generally the broader 
the characterization of employment, the broader the environment-frame, as 
more areas within the geographic region will offer employment 
opportunities. For "class of jobs," courts adopt environment-frames 
encompassing an employment field or profession and jobs containing 
certain characteristics; the latter category may overlap with more than one 
employment field or profession. Environment-frames for "broad range of 
jobs" include jobs of a firm at a particular location or of a firm in all 
locations. Within each subcategory of "class of jobs" and "broad range of 
jobs," environment-frames may also vary. 
62. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B). 
63. Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(C). 
64. Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(A). 
65. See infra notes 82–103, 109–17, 135–51 and accompanying text (discussing 
various cases where courts framed work environments broadly and denied individuals 
disability status). 
66. One might also expect exceptions where an employee would be disabled in almost 
any context, or when the court merges disability and accommodation analysis (see infra note 
167), but the cases do not demonstrate this. 
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This Subpart will not address the narrowest possible environment-
frame for "class of jobs" or "broad range of jobs," i.e., a particular job at a 
specific workplace.67  In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,68  the U.S. 
Supreme Court explicitly rejected such a narrow construction, invoking the 
EEOC regulations prohibiting "working" from being construed as a "single, 
particular job."69  I examine the potential impact of the AAA on the major 
life activity of "working" in Part IV.A.2. 
1. "Class of Jobs" 
Environment-frames for "class of jobs" may be built around 
employment fields or professions, or jobs with certain characteristics that 
may span more than one employment field or profession. So long as an 
individual demonstrates a substantial limitation in performing more than a 
particular job at a specific company, the environments assessed may vary in 
size.70  This Section demonstrates that the broader the environment 
considered for "class of jobs," the more difficult it is for plaintiffs to prove 
limitation in the major life activity of "working." Plaintiffs experience 
difficulty demonstrating disability, once the environment considered 
extends beyond the immediate workplace. 
Most of the cases in this Section discuss individuals who are "regarded 
as" (perceived as) disabled in a "class of jobs."71  Prior to the AAA, the 
67. This environment-frame creates the lowest evidentiary burden for a plaintiff trying 
to prove a limitation of the major life activity of "working," given the small environment and 
the employee’s demonstrated difficulty functioning within the workplace. 
68. See generally Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
69. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA, 29 
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2010); see Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491–93 (stating it is insufficient to be 
precluded from "one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice"); see also 
Dillon v. Mountain Coal Co., 569 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that an 
employee is not "regarded as" disabled because his employer may have perceived him as 
unable to work a job at a particular mine); E.E.O.C. v. Schneider Nat’l, Inc., 481 F.3d 507, 
512 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that an employee was not "regarded as" disabled by an 
employer that "perceived him as unfit for a particularly dangerous truck-driving position"); 
Harris v. Proviso Area for Exceptional Children, 581 F. Supp. 2d 942, 955 (N.D. Ill. 2008) 
(holding that a teacher was not limited in her ability to work because she failed to offer 
evidence that she was limited in other education positions in Chicago). 
70. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491–93; Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment 
Provisions of the ADA, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B)–(C) (2010). 
71. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006) ("The term ‘disability’ [includes], with 
respect to an individual—being regarded as having . . . an impairment that substantially 
limits one or more major life activities."). 
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evidentiary burden for individuals establishing an actual disability and a 
perceived one was the same: An individual asserting a "regarded as" claim 
was required to demonstrate that her perceived impairment, if actual, would 
"substantially limit" her in a major life activity.72  The AAA eliminates the 
need for plaintiffs to show a substantial limitation of a major life activity 
for a perceived impairment; it also restricts reasonable accommodation to 
actual disability claims.73  As a result of eliminating accommodation for 
"regarded as" plaintiffs, in the future most major life activity of "working" 
claims will likely be brought as actual rather than "regarded as" disability 
actions. Arguably courts will continue to turn to the pre-AAA "regarded 
as" cases discussed below for guidance, however, because they comprise 
the bulk of the "class of jobs" cases and utilize the same standard for 
"substantial limitation" as actual disability cases. 
a. Employment Field or Profession 
Courts consider a number of employment fields74  and professions to be 
"classes of jobs." Both narrow and broad environment-frames are used to 
describe these jobs. Generally, the narrower the frame, the easier it is for a 
plaintiff to establish a limitation in the major life activity of "working." 
Narrow environment-frames for employment fields or professions 
result in plaintiffs being considered part of the protected class. In Morris v. 
Mayor of Baltimore,75  the court constructed the environment-frame for the 
"class of jobs" for a firefighter as jobs within a particular fire department.76 
The court held that the plaintiff was "regarded as" being precluded from 
various jobs within the department because of knee, wrist, and ankle 
72. Id. § 12102(2)(C). 
73. AAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555–56 (2008) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 12102 (2006)). A plaintiff may still obtain an order to reinstate employment, 
provide back pay, or cease discriminatory conduct. 
74. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized "mechanics" as a "class of jobs." See 
Murphy v. UPS, 527 U.S. 516, 524–25 (1999) (holding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate he 
was unable to perform a "class of jobs" because he could perform different mechanic jobs); 
see also EEOC v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 111 F. App’x 394, 402–03 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(assuming without deciding "mechanics" constituted a "class of jobs"); Broussard v. Univ. of 
Cal., at Berkeley, 192 F.3d 1252, 1259 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing "animal care" as a "class 
of jobs"); McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., U.S.A., Inc., 110 F.3d 369, 370 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(recognizing "manufacturing" as a "class of jobs"); Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 
723, 727 (5th Cir. 1995) (recognizing "welding" as a "class of jobs"). 
75. See generally Morris v. Mayor of Balt., 437 F. Supp. 2d 508 (D. Md. 2006). 
76. Id. at 515–16. 
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injuries.77  In reaching its holding, the court reasoned that the "[p]laintiff’s 
job expectations and training solely revolve around his career with a 
specific fire department. Were plaintiff to seek a different job at this stage 
in his career, he would be forced to ‘alter his career path and/or to once 
again start at the bottom of a ladder.’"78  Similarly, in Howell v. New Haven 
Board of Education,79  the court denied summary judgment to the school 
board on a "regarded as" claim, after the district transferred a teacher with 
diabetes and depression to another school with a twenty-five percent pay 
reduction.80  While the court did not frame the relevant environment for the 
"class of jobs" of teaching as a single school, the court focused on the 
teacher’s abilities to perform his job within his original school, expressing 
concern over the involuntary nature of the transfer to the less preferable 
teaching post outside that school.81  
Broader environment-frames for "class of jobs" within employment 
fields or professions typically lead to a finding of no substantial limitation 
in the major life activity of "working." In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 
the U.S. Supreme Court found that twin sisters with severe myopia were not 
"regarded as" substantially limited in working as pilots, once their 
occupation was viewed as including jobs outside the ones they applied for 
as "global pilots," such as regional airline pilots and flight instructors.82 
While the court did not discuss geography, the sisters’ "class of jobs" was 
understood to include the locations of major airlines as well as regional 
airlines and flight schools. 
Several other cases involving the aviation industry provide support for 
the thesis that current assessment of broad environment-frames undermines 
eligibility for disability protections. The Eleventh Circuit in Witter v. Delta 
Airlines,83  held that the plaintiff pilot was not "regarded as" disabled after 
defining the relevant environment-frame as including both piloting and 
"non-piloting jobs . . . utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or 
77. Id. at 514. 
78. Id. (citing Huber v. Howard Cnty., 849 F. Supp. 407, 412 (D. Md. 1994), which 
held that a volunteer firefighter whose asthma prevented him from advancing his career was 
disabled under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973). 
79. See generally Howell v. New Haven Bd. of Educ., 309 F. Supp. 2d 286 (D. Conn. 
2004). 
80. See id. at 291–92 (stating that the evidence could show that the school board 
transferred plaintiff because she was perceived as mentally disabled). 
81. Id. 
82. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 493 (1999). 
83. See generally Witter v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 138 F.3d 1366 (11th Cir. 1998). 
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abilities . . . in the Atlanta area."84  Likewise, in Carter v. Ridge,85  the Fifth 
Circuit defined the relevant environment-frame for a pilot as the "aviation 
field," consisting of piloting and non-piloting jobs in the area.86  The court 
held that the plaintiff, who suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) when piloting "light piston driven" aircraft, was not disabled "in all 
jobs within the aviation field or from holding a large number of jobs in 
other categories of employment."87  In Duffett v. Lahood,88  the Second 
Circuit employed a broad environment-frame of all air traffic control jobs 
within the region and held that the plaintiff air traffic control officer may 
not have been "regarded as" disabled by his employer, even though his 
employer viewed him as unable to hold positions involving "live" air 
traffic.89  The court did not explain, however, what a "non-live" air traffic 
control job might entail. 
Lower courts have reached similar results with respect to other 
employment fields or professions. In Milholland v. Sumner County Board 
of Education,90  the Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff was not "regarded 
as" disabled as an education administrator when she was transferred to a 
teaching post at a high school in another city.91  The court stated that "a 
teacher . . . is in the same class of jobs as an administrator," namely 
"educators."92  In Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC,93  the Fourth 
Circuit held that the plaintiff was not "regarded as" disabled with respect to 
her ability to perform as an actress regionally and nationally, though she 
was unable to perform with the defendant touring theater company.94 
84. Id. at 1370–71 n.2. 
85. See generally Carter v. Ridge, 255 F. App’x 826 (5th Cir. 2007). 
86. See id. at 830 (involving a Rehabilitation Act claim decided under the definition of 
"disability" provided in the ADA). 
87. Id. 
88. See generally Duffett v. LaHood, 331 F. App’x 763 (2d Cir. 2009). 
89. See id. at 765 (involving a Rehabilitation Act claim decided under the definition of 
"disability" provided in the ADA). 
90. See generally Millholland v. Sumner Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 569 F.3d 562 (6th Cir. 
2009). 
91. Id. at 568. Millholland was transferred from an assistant principal position in 
Hendersonville, Tennessee, to a teaching position in Gallatin, Tennessee, over fifteen miles 
away. Id. 
92. Id.; see also id. ("Administrators and teachers are both educators with similar 
training, knowledge, skills or abilities and thus are in the same class . . . ." (citations 
omitted)). 
93. See generally Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC, 375 F.3d 266 (4th Cir. 
2004). 
94. Id. at 278. 
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Rohan suffered from severe and chronic PTSD and depression caused by 
paternal sexual abuse and incest.95  Her condition was so severe that she 
"act[ed] and fe[lt] as if the molestation [was] occurring at the present 
moment" when she saw someone who resembled her father or someone 
scolding a child.96  Such episodes could and did occur during a 
performance.97  The court held that Rohan was not "regarded as" 
substantially limited in the major life activity of "working" because her 
employer viewed her as capable of acting and singing, even though she was 
unable to tour with their theater group.98  Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in 
Bryson v. Regis Corp.,99  held that a plaintiff hairstylist was not substantially 
impaired in her ability to work within the cosmetology field, only from 
serving as a manager of a hair salon.100 
At least one court has applied an environment-frame to include jobs 
available in an employment field on an entire island. The court in Fournier 
v. Payco Foods Corp.101  held that the plaintiff, who was an ice cream 
delivery truck driver, was not impaired in a "class of jobs" because he failed 
to demonstrate that he was unable to perform delivery truck jobs in the 
territory of Puerto Rico.102 	Most courts have held that national 
environment-frames for jobs in an employment field or profession are too 
broad.103 
An exception to a broad frame in an employment field or profession 
limiting plaintiff protections is the Tenth Circuit case, Justice v. Crown 
Cork & Seal Co.104  In Justice, the plaintiff electrician developed vertigo 
95. See id. at 269 (noting Rohan’s PTSD manifested itself in chronic "dissociative 
flashback episodes" accompanied by a variety of physical symptoms). 
96. Id. at 269 n.1. 
97. See id. at 269–70 (describing PTSD attacks during one show and multiple 
rehearsals over the course of several weeks). 
98. Id. at 278. Rohan had worked for a non-touring company and was experiencing 
added stress while on the road. Id. at 269–70. Without any discussion of whether non-
touring jobs were still available or whether they would enable Rohan to function as an 
actress, however, the Fourth Circuit held that she was not substantially limited in working as 
an actress. Id. at 278. 
99. See generally Bryson v. Regis Corp., 498 F.3d 561 (6th Cir. 2007). 
100. Id. at 567. 
101. See generally Fournier v. Payco Foods Corp., 611 F. Supp. 2d 120 (D.P.R. 2009). 
102. Id. at 131. 
103. Webb v. Garelick Mfg. Co., 94 F.3d 484, 487 (8th Cir. 1996); Babb v. S.F. 
Newspaper Agency, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21932, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 1996). 
104. See generally Justice v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 527 F.3d 1080 (10th Cir. 2008). 
Cf. Contra De Paoli v. Abbott Labs., 140 F.3d 668, 673–74 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
plaintiff was significantly impaired in her ability to conduct assembly line work in Chicago, 
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and balance issues after a stroke and was transferred to a janitorial job.105 
The court reversed summary judgment for the employer manufacturer on 
the ground that plaintiff’s transfer could indicate that he was "regarded as" 
significantly restricted in his ability to perform any job in the electrical 
field.106  In reaching a favorable outcome for the plaintiff, the court 
assumed the relevant environment to be regional or perhaps even national, 
encompassing any electrical job rather than only those jobs available at 
Crown.107  One possible explanation for the different outcome in this case is 
the employer’s discrimination was egregious. The court noted that the 
record lacked any medical evidence that the plaintiff, who had served the 
company for about ten years, could no longer perform as an electrician.108 
b. Jobs with Certain Characteristics 
Under the "jobs with certain characteristics" conception of "class of 
jobs," the work at stake may involve features—such as temperature 
conditions, social interaction, and heavy lifting—that cut across various 
employment fields or professions. As with other "classes of jobs," broad 
conceptions of "jobs with certain characteristics" often imply large 
environment-frames, even when geography is not specifically discussed. 
Plaintiff success varies when courts apply a broad environment-frame, 
though broad frames typically yield negative results for plaintiffs in this 
context as well. When courts use broad environment-frames, positive 
outcomes for plaintiffs may occur in cases involving significant employer 
misconduct. 
In Murphy v. United Parcel Service,109  the U.S. Supreme Court 
broadly defined "class of jobs" involving certain characteristics, holding 
that a mechanic with severe hypertension was not "regarded as" disabled 
when he was terminated, even though he was viewed as unable to safely 
test drive commercial vehicles and obtain Department of Transportation 
though she did not require an accommodation because her tendinitis and tenosynovitis 
prevented her from fulfilling the essential functions of her position). 
105. Justice, 527 F.3d at 1088. 
106. See id. (noting it was dangerous for plaintiff to be around electrical currents). The 
court also found that the defendant may have perceived the plaintiff as unable to perform a 
"broad range of jobs across various classes." Id. at 1091. 
107. See id. at 1088, 1091 ("The Worland plant does not, of course, represent a 
microcosm of all possible jobs."). 
108. Id. at 1082, 1088. 
109. See generally Murphy v. UPS, 527 U.S. 516 (1999). 
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(DOT) certification.110  Rather, the court argued, Murphy was otherwise 
"generally employable as a mechanic" and could seek employment 
elsewhere "as [a] diesel mechanic, automotive mechanic, gas-engine 
repairer [or] gas-welding equipment mechanic," all of which did not require 
DOT certification for commercial vehicles.111 
Similarly, three circuits have implied the use of a broad environment-
frame and denied disability protections in a "class of jobs" involving certain 
characteristics. In Parker v. Port Authority of Allegheny County,112  the 
Third Circuit held that a plaintiff was not "regarded as" substantially limited 
in her ability to work because her employer did not feel she "was incapable 
of performing all jobs that involved any degree of stress, any type or 
amount of driving, and any type or degree of interaction with the public," 
only the "particular mix" of those factors involved in driving a bus.113  The 
Tenth Circuit in Nealey v. Water District Number One,114  found that an 
administrative assistant was not "regarded as" disabled when her employer 
transferred her to a less desirable full-time administrative position for which 
she received the same level of pay and benefits.115  In Boykin v. Honda 
Manufacturing,116  the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff with 
emphysema was "fully capable of working anywhere that did not expose 
him to the heat, humidity, dust, and pace of the Honda manufacturing line 
and, therefore, [was] not disqualified from a class of jobs."117 
The Eighth and First Circuits, however, have reached positive results 
for plaintiffs using a broad environment-frame. As in Justice, these cases 
involved egregious employer conduct. In Chalfant v. Titan Distribution, 
Inc.,118  the Eight Circuit held that there was sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that the defendant believed the plaintiff was restricted 
substantially in his ability to work in a class or range of jobs with medium- 
110. Id. at 524–25. 
111. Id. Presumably after the AAA, Murphy could establish disability based on a 
substantial limitation of the major bodily function of circulation. AAA, Pub. L. No. 110-  
325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555–56 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006)). 
112. See generally Parker v. Port Auth. of Alleghany Cnty., 90 F. App’x 600 (3d Cir. 
2004). 
113. Id. at 603–05. 
114. See generally Nealey v. Water Dist. No. 1., 324 F. App’x 744 (10th Cir. 2009). 
115. Id. at 749. 
116. See generally Boykin v. Honda Mfg. of Ala., 288 F. App’x 594 (11th Cir. 2008). 
117. See id. at 597 (recognizing plaintiff was able to work two other jobs: hauling 
fertilizer and concrete). 
118. See generally Chalfant v. Titan Distrib., Inc., 475 F. 3d 982 (8th Cir. 2007). 
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strength demands.119  The court adopted a broad environment-frame, 
including all jobs within the region with those characteristics, which, 
according to a vocational expert in the case, encompassed more than 
seventy percent of the jobs in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.120 
Chalfant had successfully performed the job for which he applied for over 
five years for a subsidiary of the company.121  Further, despite employer 
Titan’s statements, the position did not involve heavy lifting.122  In addition, 
Chalfant was told he failed his physical examination without medical 
proof.123  Similarly, in Sensing v. Outback Steakhouse of Florida, LLC,124 
the First Circuit employed a broad environment-frame in holding that a 
plaintiff was substantially limited in "her ability to work in a broad class of 
jobs that would have required her to be on her feet."125  Sensing, who 
worked in the take-out section of the restaurant and had twice been 
employee of the month, was demoted to "light duty work" at half the pay 
and a third of the hours, after taking a day and a half approved leave for 
complications from multiple sclerosis.126 
2. "Broad Range of Jobs" 
An individual may also demonstrate a substantial limitation of the 
major life activity of "working" by proving an inability to perform "a broad 
range of jobs . . . within [the] geographical area."127  "Broad range of jobs" 
may include jobs at a particular employer location or within a company 
with multiple locations. 	Similar to "class of jobs" cases, as the 
environment-frame becomes larger, plaintiffs’ ability to establish a 
substantial limitation in "working" decreases. 
119. Id. at 989. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 986. 
122. Id. at 989. 
123. Id. at 987. 
124. See generally Sensing v. Outback Steakhouse of Fla., LLC, 575 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 
2009). 
125. Id. at 156. 
126. Id. at 148–50. The court remanded on the issue of whether Sensing was 
constructively discharged. Id. at 159–60. 
127. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA, 29 
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(C) (2010). 
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a. Jobs at a Particular Employer Location 
Employment at a particular geographic location is the smallest 
environment-frame for "broad range of jobs." As with "class of jobs," 
plaintiffs are often considered part of the protected class when a court looks 
to jobs at a particular employer location. Even within the "particular 
employer location" category of "broad range of jobs," however, courts may 
construct narrow or broad frames. In cases where plaintiffs are not granted 
protected class status, courts frequently adopt a broad reading of available 
jobs within an employer location. 
A number of courts have examined whether an employee is "regarded 
as" incapable of performing any job at a specific location for the defendant 
employer and thereby substantially limited in a "broad range of jobs." The 
Sixth and Tenth Circuits have recognized that failing to offer a plaintiff any 
job at a particular location may be evidence that the employer regards the 
plaintiff as disabled. In Beery v. Associated Hygiene Products, LLC,128  the 
Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment for the employer because a jury 
could find that the company was "mistaken in its belief that [claimant’s] 
back condition would indefinitely prevent him from doing any available 
jobs at the warehouse."129  In Jones v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,130  the 
Tenth Circuit, finding for the defendant on unrelated grounds, recognized 
that "when an employer is hiring for a broad range of jobs in the relevant 
geographical area, its decision not to offer an employee one of a broad 
range of company jobs may be relevant evidence of its perception of that 
employee’s abilities."131  In Jones, the plaintiff, who was a package vehicle 
driver, was not offered another job within a particular location of U.P.S. 
after he injured his shoulder and two doctors assigned him permanent 
weight lifting restrictions.132  Similarly, the Sixth Circuit held in Burns v. 
128. See generally Beery v. Associated Hygiene Prods., LLC, 243 F. App’x 129 (6th 
Cir. 2007). 
129. See id. at 134 (analyzing the disability claim under the Ohio Civil Rights Act, 
which applies the same standards as the ADA). The court took a similar view in Wysong v. 
Dow Chemical Co., 503 F.3d 441, 443 (6th Cir. 2007), concluding that a reasonable jury 
could find that the defendant employer regarded the plaintiff as unable to perform any jobs 
in its facility due to her alleged dependency on pain killers. Id. Dow sent the plaintiff a 
letter stating that she was "unfit to return to work" and did not offer her another position 
within the facility. Id. at 453; see also Collins v. Yellow Freight Sys. Inc., 93 F. App’x 854, 
861 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that plaintiff with a back injury was "regarded as" disabled 
because he was perceived as unable to perform certain manual labor jobs). 
130. See generally Jones v. UPS, 502 F.3d 1176 (10th Cir. 2007). 
131. Id. at 1192. 
132. Id. at 1181. 
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Coca-Cola Enterprises,133  that the plaintiff product deliverer was 
substantially limited in "working" in a "broad range of jobs" because his 
back injury prevented him from performing at least fifty percent of the jobs 
available to him at the Knoxville bottling company.134 
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits, however, have found for defendants 
after broadly constructing the range of jobs available at a particular 
location. In Squibb v. Memorial Medical Center,135  the Seventh Circuit 
held that the plaintiff nurse, who was incapable of performing "patient care" 
nursing jobs, was not disabled because she failed to demonstrate that she 
was unable to perform "non-patient care" nursing jobs for her hospital 
employer.136  Similarly, in Moreno v. Brownlee,137  the Fifth Circuit held 
that the plaintiff with carpal tunnel syndrome was not substantially limited 
in performing jobs at an Army base, only the particular job of "target device 
servicer."138  However, the Army then argued that it did not have a position 
at the base to which to reassign him that would avoid "repetitive, stressful 
work with his hands and wrists, and . . . lift[ing] objects weighing more 
than fifteen pounds."139 
b. Jobs Within a Company 
Where a company exists in more than one location, all jobs within the 
company throughout the various locations may serve as the environment-
frame for a "broad range of jobs." The size of this type of environment-
frame necessarily depends on the size of the employer and how employers 
view available jobs within the company, though the frame is usually 
relatively broad. When courts use this environment-frame, results are 
typically less favorable for plaintiffs than with a frame including a single 
location. 
A number of circuits have held that plaintiffs are not disabled in the 
major life activity of "working" with respect to a "broad range of jobs" 
133. See generally Burns v. Coca-Cola Enter., 222 F.3d 247 (6th Cir. 2000). 
134. Id. at 256. The court also held, however, that the plaintiff was not entitled to a 
remedy because he failed to follow the company’s transfer-request policy in seeking his 
accommodation. Id. 
135. See generally Squibb v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 497 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2007). 
136. Id. at 783. 
137. See generally Moreno v. Brownlee, 85 F. App’x 23 (5th Cir. 2004). 
138. Id. at 27–28. 
139. Id. at 24. 
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within a company. For example, in the recent Eighth Circuit decision 
McLain v. Anderson Corp.,140  the court held that the defendant did not 
regard the plaintiff truck driver as substantially limited in a broad range of 
jobs when he was unable to perform jobs regularly requiring unloading but 
could manage "run off" delivery jobs or obtain further training and 
qualification and assume an inter-state driving position.141  The plaintiff 
could also perform non-driving jobs in the Logistics Department or 
Renewal Center, though no such jobs were available.142  Likewise, in 
Daugherty v. Sajar Plastics, Inc.,143  the Sixth Circuit held that the 
defendant did not regard the plaintiff, who used narcotics to manage pain, 
as unable to perform all maintenance jobs within the company, only those 
involving "dangerous machinery."144  In DePrisco v. Delta Air Lines, 
Inc.,145  the same court held that a reservation sales agent, whose vertigo 
impaired her job performance, could serve as a flight or Crown Room 
attendant.146  Delta had openings for both posts within the company but 
chose not to hire the plaintiff.147  The Fifth Circuit in Windly v. Hightower 
Oil Co.,148  held that the plaintiff was not "regarded as" substantially limited 
in a "broad range of jobs" because her employer only viewed her as 
incapable of supervising some "particularly demanding" convenience 
stores, not convenience stores generally.149  The plaintiff was not, however, 
offered an alternative work location.150  Along similar lines, courts have 
held that while plaintiffs may be substantially limited in performing the 
duties of "police officer," they are not so limited in the "broad range of 
jobs" included in "law enforcement" within the police force.151 
140. See generally McLain v. Anderson Corp., 567 F.3d 956 (8th Cir. 2009). 
141. See id. at 968 (analyzing the disability claim under the Minnesota Human Rights 
Act, which applies the same standards as the ADA). "‘Run-off’ deliveries . . . are 
unscheduled, smaller deliveries to retail stores of lumberyards." Id. at 959. An employee 
making run-off deliveries is on-call and must respond to jobs as they arise. Id. at 963. 
142. Id. at 968. 
143. See generally Daugherty v. Sajar Plastics, Inc., 544 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2008). 
144. See id. at 706 (analyzing the disability claim under an Ohio Civil Rights Act, 
which applies the same standards as the ADA). 
145. See generally DePrisco v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 90 F. App’x 790 (6th Cir. 2004). 
146. Id. at 794–95. 
147. Id. at 793. 
148. See generally Windly v. Hightower Oil Co., 91 F. App’x 330 (5th Cir. 2004). 
149. Id. at 332–33. 
150. Id. at 331. 
151. See, e.g., Epps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 590–92 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(finding plaintiff could serve as a detective or elsewhere in the police department); Rossbach 
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Plaintiffs have recovered in only a couple of cases when the 
environment-frame of "jobs within a company" extended to more than one 
location. These cases involved plaintiffs with a significant limitation in the 
ability to perform a "broad range of jobs." In Eshelman v. Agere Systems, 
Inc.,152  the Third Circuit found that a woman with chemotherapy-induced 
memory loss was "regarded as" disabled when she was not assigned to a job 
in another city in the state following corporate restructuring.153  The 
Seventh Circuit in Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, Inc.,154  held that a 
"rational trier of fact could reasonably find that the substantial percentage 
reductions [thirty-five to eighty-nine percent] in the broad range of jobs 
available to [the impaired "production associate"] plaintiffs [in Tippecanoe 
County, Indiana] . . . substantially limited them in the major life activity of 
working."155 
3. Conclusion 
The "working" cases support the thesis that generally the broader the 
environment-frame used for assessing "substantial limitation," the less 
likely a plaintiff will demonstrate the requisite limitation of a major life 
activity and be considered part of the protected class. Courts will instead 
view the plaintiff as being able to function in some portion of the broad 
environment and thus as not disabled. 
These cases also indicate that the varying construction of environment-
frames leads to inconsistent results for plaintiffs. For example, several 
courts have held that "police officer" is too narrow a field to constitute a 
"class of jobs" and have used instead "law enforcement" jobs as the 
environment for framing the ability to work.156  However, other courts have 
held that a plaintiff’s ADA claim may succeed by proving that an employer 
v. City of Miami, 371 F.3d 1354, 1360–61 (11th Cir. 2004) ("‘[P]olice officer’ is too narrow 
a range of jobs to constitute a ‘class of jobs’ as that term is defined in the EEOC 
regulations."); cf. Sheehan v. City of Gloucester, 321 F.3d 21, 25–26 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting 
plaintiff could serve as a security guard). 
152. See generally Eshelman v. Agere Syst., Inc., 554 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2009). 
153. See id. at 435–36 (analyzing the disability claims under the Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Act, which applies the same standards as the ADA). 
154. See generally Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 1998). 
155. Id. at 676. 
156. See supra note 151 (listing cases in which plaintiffs’ inability to continue serving 
as police officers did not disqualify them from a "class of jobs" or a "broad range of jobs" 
within law enforcement). 
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viewed the claimant as substantially limited in the ability to work as a 
firefighter.157  Such inconsistent use of environment-frames makes it 
difficult for plaintiffs to know what type of evidence they must offer in 
order to prevail on a major life activity of "working" claim.158  The 
environment-frame chosen also significantly alters plaintiffs’ evidentiary 
burden. One can assume that it is easier for plaintiffs to produce evidence 
that they are substantially limited in the ability to work in a narrow 
environment, which only considers their capability to perform a select 
number of jobs, than in a broad environment compassing many 
employment possibilities. 
III. Environment-Framing and Remedy 
Like the statutory test for disability eligibility, determining whether an 
individual is entitled to a remedy implies the need to define and assess the 
environment in which an individual is functioning. Courts look to 
workplaces,159  transportation vehicles and facilities,160  other places of 
public service,161  and places of public accommodation162  to determine 
whether alteration of physical spaces, or the activities occurring within 
these spaces, would improve access for individuals with disabilities. As in 
the eligibility context, courts define environment-frames for remedy on an 
ad hoc basis.163  Unlike environment-frame analysis for eligibility, however, 
courts typically adopt narrow environment-frames when determining 
entitlement to remedy.164  These narrow frames may limit or preclude a 
157. See Morris v. Mayor of Balt., 437 F. Supp. 2d 508, 515 (D. Md. 2006) (concluding 
that a firefighter who had served for thirty years in the same fire department could be 
impaired in a "class of jobs" due to the difficulty of seeking a job at another fire department 
at such a late stage in his career); see also Huber v. Howard Cnty., 849 F. Supp. 407, 412 (D. 
Md. 1994) (finding that "because Huber is disqualified from advancing the firefighter career 
for which he is well trained and in which he has an extensive background, his disability is 
substantially limiting as to being a career firefighter"). 
158. See, e.g., Dillon v. Mountain Coal Co., 569 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(noting that plaintiff’s claim failed because he did not describe other jobs in the area that fell 







ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2006). 
Id. §§ 12142, 12143(a), 12144, 12146, 
Id. §§ 12131–32. 
Id. §§ 12182(a)–(b), 12183. 
Infra Part III.A.–B. 
Infra Part III.A.–B. 
12147, 12182(b)(2)(B)–(C), 12184(a)–(b). 
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remedy.165  Thus, at both ends of disability analysis—eligibility and 
remedy—courts use different environment-frames to limit protection under 
the ADA. 
This Part addresses the role of environment-framing and remedy, 
specifically reasonable accommodation or other modification. Subpart A 
provides a brief overview of judicial trends for such injunctive relief. Cases 
indicate that narrow frames are often used, and they limit or undermine 
remedy. When broad frames are used, plaintiffs typically receive 
accommodation or other modification. Subpart B focuses on Title II and 
reasonable modification within prisons and jails. I chose to explore this 
context in detail because it demonstrates that, even within a clearly defined 
finite space, courts may frame environments in numerous ways and reach 
disparate outcomes.166 
A. Reasonable Accommodation and Other Modification 
Once an individual is deemed eligible for disability protections, courts 
must assess whether she is entitled to a remedy.167  Under Title I, a plaintiff 
is entitled to reasonable accommodation in the workplace, including that 
necessary to fulfill the essential functions of her job.168  Titles II and III 
require that a plaintiff receive structural or other modification to allow 
access to transportation, other public services, and places of public 
accommodation.169  All requested accommodation or other modification is 
165. Infra Part III.A.–B. 
166. Other spaces may also be clearly defined and finite, of course—such as some 
workspaces—though they may be more difficult to compare, as they are likely subject to 
greater variation. 
167. For a discussion of the stages of disability analysis under the ADA, see Ani B. 
Satz, A Jurisprudence of Dysfunction: On the Role of "Normal Species Functioning" in 
Disability Analysis, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 221, 248–50 (2006). 
168. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2006). 
[R]easonable accommodation [includes]: (A) making existing facilities used by 
employees readily accessible to and useable by individuals with disabilities; and 
(B) job restructuring, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or 
modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications 
of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers 
or interpreters, and other similar accommodations . . . . 
Id. Accommodation supports equality of opportunity with respect to job applications, work 
performance (the ability to fulfill the essential functions of one’s job), and the benefits and 
privileges of employment. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of 
the ADA, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(o)(1), 1630.9 (2010). 
169. ADA §§ 12131–32, 12142, 12143(a), 12144, 12146, 12147 (Title II); id. 
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subject to the affirmative defenses of "undue hardship"170  and "direct 
threat."171 
The case law indicates a couple of trends. Overall, the narrower the 
environment assessed, the less likely an individual will receive a desired 
accommodation or other modification.172  This is because she will be 
§§ 12182(a)–(b), 12183, 12184(a)–(b) (Title III). 
170. See id. § 12111(10) (defining "undue hardship" under Title I as "requiring 
significant difficulty or expense," measured by "the nature and cost of the accommodation" 
and the financial resources and impact of the accommodation on the facility making the 
accommodation as well as the covered entity, if different). The defense varies slightly for 
Titles II and III. Infra notes 284–86 and accompanying text. 
171. See ADA § 12113(b) ("[A]n individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health 
and safety of other individuals in the workplace"); see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 
624, 649 (1998) (holding that a "direct threat" is one that poses a "significant risk" to others 
based on "medical and other objective evidence"). The direct threat defense was extended to 
harm to self in Chevron v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 80 (2002). 
172. Compare Shannon v. Postmaster Gen. of U.S. Postal Serv., 335 F. App’x 21, 24– 
36 (11th Cir. 2009) (considering an environment of a particular workplace and finding that 
no accommodation was required), Mobley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 531 F.3d 539, 546–57 (7th 
Cir. 2008) (same), Molski v. Foley Estates Vineyard, 521 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(considering an environment of the interior of a wine-tasting room but not the space leading 
to the room and finding that modification of the room, but not a ramp to the room, was 
required), Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526, 540–42 (6th Cir. 2008) (considering an 
environment of a single jail and finding that no modification was required), Norman v. Tex. 
Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 293 F. App’x 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2008) (considering an environment 
of a single prison and finding that no modification was required), Brown v. City of 
Cleveland, 294 F. App’x 226, 232–34 (6th Cir. 2008) (considering an environment of a 
particular workplace and finding that no accommodation was required), Bircoll v. Miami-
Dade Cnty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1085–89 (11th Cir. 2007) (considering environments of a 
specific location of a police stop and a single police station and finding that no modification 
was required in either location), Ozlek v. Potter, 259 F. App’x 417, 420–21 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(considering an environment of a particular workplace and finding that no accommodation 
was required), and Garthright-Dietrich v. Atlanta Landmarks, Inc., 452 F.3d 1269, 1275 
(11th Cir. 2006) (considering an environment of a particular theater and finding that no 
modification was required), with Simmons v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 340 F. App’x 24, 27– 
28 (2d Cir. 2009) (considering an environment of all jobs within a company and finding that 
an accommodation was required), Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1043 (9th Cir. 
2008) (considering an environment of Seven Eleven stores within 550 miles of plaintiff’s 
residence and finding that plaintiff had standing to challenge access barriers), Am. Council 
of the Blind v. Paulson, 525 F.3d 1256, 1268, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (considering all users of 
money, not only sighted individuals, and finding that modification was required), Miller v. 
Cal. Speedway Corp., 536 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 2008) (considering the spectator "line 
of sight" throughout the speedway rather than in designated areas and finding that 
modification was required), Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1226–28 
(11th Cir. 2008) (considering the city of Treasure Island and finding that modification was 
required), Woodruff v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cnty., 304 F. App’x 795, 800 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(considering an entire school district and finding that accommodation may be required), 
Bacon v. City of Richmond, 475 F.3d 633, 639 (4th Cir. 2007) (same), and Woodruff v. 
Peters, 482 F.3d 521, 527–28 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (considering the workplace and home and 
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viewed as functional within a small, legally-protected area, such as a 
portion of a workplace or place of public accommodation.173  In addition, 
courts often adopt narrow environment-frames for reasonable 
accommodation and other modification, and, in these cases, plaintiffs are 
usually denied a remedy.174  Interestingly, following the adoption of the 
AAA, courts must use the narrowest frame—actually no frame—to assess 
finding that accommodation was required). 
173. See Shannon v. Postmaster Gen. of the U.S. Postal Serv., 335 F. App’x 21, 24–26 
(11th Cir. 2009) (considering a particular workplace); Mobley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 531 F.3d 
539, 546–47 (7th Cir. 2008) (same); Molski v. Foley Estates Vineyard & Winery, LLC., 531 
F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2008) (considering the interior of a wine-tasting room but not the 
space leading to the room); Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526, 540–42 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(considering a single jail); Norman v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 293 F. App’x 285, 288 
(5th Cir. 2008) (considering a single prison); Brown v. City of Cleveland, 294 F. App’x 226, 
232–34 (6th Cir. 2008) (considering a particular workplace); Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 
480 F.3d 1072, 1085–89 (11th Cir. 2007) (considering the specific location of a police stop 
and a single police station); Ozlek v. Potter, 259 F. App’x 417, 420–21 (3rd Cir. 2007) 
(considering a particular workplace); Garthright-Dietrich v. Atlanta Landmarks, Inc., 452 
F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2006) (considering a particular theater). 
174. See Shannon v. Postmaster Gen. of the U.S. Postal Serv., 335 F. App’x 21, 24–26 
(11th Cir. 2009) (considering a particular workplace and finding no accommodation was 
required); Mobley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 531 F.3d 539, 546–57 (7th Cir. 2008) (same); Molski 
v. Foley Estates Vineyard & Winery, LLC., 531 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(considering the interior of a wine-tasting room and finding that modification of the room 
but not a ramp to the room was required); Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526, 540–42 (6th 
Cir. 2008) (considering a single jail and finding that no modification was required); Norman 
v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 293 F. App’x 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2008) (considering a 
single prison and finding that no modification was required); Brown v. City of Cleveland, 
294 F. App’x 226, 232–34 (6th Cir. 2008) (considering a particular workplace and finding 
that no accommodation was required); Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1085– 
89 (11th Cir. 2007) (considering the specific location of a police stop and a single police 
station and finding that no modification was required in either location); Ozlek v. Potter, 259 
F. App’x 417, 420–21 (3d Cir. 2007) (considering a particular workplace and finding that no 
accommodation was required); Garthright-Dietrich v. Atlanta Landmarks, Inc., 452 F.3d 
1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2006) (considering a particular theater and finding that no 
modification was required). 
Even in instances where a remedy is provided, the ADA does not require that a plaintiff 
receive an accommodation that facilitates a preferred mode of functioning, which arguably 
exacerbates the problem of obtaining a meaningful remedy. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12111(10) (2006) (discussing "the" or "an," meaning "one" accommodation); see also 
Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA, 29 C.F.R. § 1630 
app., 1630.9 (2010) ("[T]he employer providing the accommodation has the ultimate 
discretion to choose between effective accommodations."). 
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individuals who are "regarded as" disabled175  because they are no longer 
entitled to accommodation.176 
The next Subpart explores in detail the effects of narrow environment-
framing in the remedy context, using prisons and jails as examples. 
B. Incarceration and the Finite Environment 
Prisons and jails, covered under Title II of the ADA, provide a 
particularly good example of the effects of environment-framing on 
requested modification.177  Such facilities constitute finite environments 
with substantial similarities, limiting the ways environment-frames may be 
drawn.178  Even within the confined environments of prisons or jails, 
judicial construction of environment-frames for remedy purposes varies 
significantly. 
This Part will examine the structural and non-structural modification 
required to access prison services, programs, and activities under Title II.179 
175. AAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555–56 (2008) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 12102 (2006)). 
176. Id. Prior to the AAA, courts determined the relevant environment-frame for 
"regarded as" plaintiffs, and it was usually narrow. Supra Part II.B. 
177. Title II of the ADA applies to public services. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12131–32 
(2006). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that Title II covers prisoners in state correctional 
institutions. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998). Thus, if a prisoner is 
both disabled and an otherwise qualified individual, a state prison may not deny services, 
programs, or activities merely because the prisoner has a disability. ADA § 12132; see also 
Mason v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 559 F.3d 880, 886 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting that prisoners 
who are qualified individuals with a disability are entitled to meaningful access to prison 
benefits). 
178. A prisoner’s ability to function is examined within the confines and conditions of 
prison. See, e.g., Shedlock v. Dep’t of Corr., 818 N.E.2d 1022, 1030 (Mass. 2004) 
(examining a prisoner’s ability to move to different areas of the prison to determine whether 
he is substantially limited in his ability to walk); Purcell v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 1998 WL 
10236, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 1998) (examining an inmate’s ability to interact with fellow 
prisoners and prison staff to determine whether he is substantially limited in the major life 
activity of communicating). Prisoners are necessarily limited in the ability to walk, work, 
and communicate with others. For this reason, courts often place great weight on a 
prisoner’s medical reports. See, e.g., id. (relying on several doctors’ reports to determine 
how seriously plaintiff prisoner’s Tourette’s Syndrome limited his ability to communicate). 
179. Title II states that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reasons of 
such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, 
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by such entity." 
ADA § 12132. The regulations supporting Title II require that "[a] public entity, in 
providing any aid, benefit, or service, may not . . . on the basis of disability . . . [a]fford a 
qualified individual with a disability an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, 
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Federal cases pertaining to structural modification may be divided into 
those involving environment-frames that consist of: cells, areas of a prison 
or jail extending beyond a cell, and an entire prison or jail. Cases 
pertaining to access that do not require structural modification rely on 
environments constructed relative to people: a single disabled inmate (a 
proxy for one prison or jail), disabled and non-disabled inmates within a 
prison or jail (one prison or jail), and disabled and non-disabled inmates 
within regional prisons (prisons or jails within a region). As with other 
modification cases, the broader the environment-frame courts use, the 
larger the accessible space required and the less interrupted disability 
protections become. 
1. Requests for Structural Modification 
Under Title II, inmates may request modification to access certain 
physical spaces of a prison or jail for services, programs, and activities.180 
Three groups of environment-frames emerge in ADA jurisprudence 
involving requests for structural modification: a prison or jail cell, 
particular areas beyond a cell, and an entire facility. Courts most often 
interpret Title II to require modification in the first two (narrower) contexts. 
As a result, disability protections attach only to certain prison or jail areas. 
Some courts view the relevant environment for assessment as a cell, 
and deny requests for access outside that area. For example, in Baribeau v. 
City of Minneapolis,181  plaintiff inmate’s prosthetic leg was confiscated 
while he was in jail.182  Without the leg, the plaintiff could not access some 
parts of the jail, including the basketball court, where he stated he "might 
have played [basketball]."183  The court held that providing plaintiff with a 
wheelchair and an ADA-compliant cell was sufficient.184  Similarly, in 
Purcell v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections,185  the court found that 
benefit, or service that is not equal to that afforded others." Nondiscrimination on the Basis 
of Disability in State & Local Gov’t Servs., 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(ii) (2010). 
180. See United States v. Georgia (Goodman), 546 U.S. 151, 160 n.* (2006) (Stevens, 
J., concurring) (finding it is unclear "whether certain of [plaintiff’s] claims are even covered 
by Title II . . . [such as] lack of access to . . . ‘television, phone calls, [and] entertainment’"). 
181. See generally Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465 (8th Cir. 2010). 
182. Id. at 472. 
183. Id. at 485. 
184. Id. at 484. 
185. See generally Purcell v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., No. Civ. A. 95-6720, 1998 WL 10236, 
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 1998). 
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the appropriate modification for a prisoner with joint disease and Tourette’s 
Syndrome was to "allow[] him to remain in a handicapped-accessible 
cell."186 
Other courts frame the environment for prison access as extending 
beyond a prison cell but not to a complete prison. When the relevant prison 
environment is more broadly construed, prisoners have greater success with 
modification claims. A number of cases deal with shower facilities located 
outside prison cells. In Outlaw v. City of Dothan,187  the court held that the 
shower in the city jail must be both accessible and available to an inmate 
who wears an artificial leg and has burns on his body that require him to 
shower frequently.188  Several other cases recognize similar claims with 
respect to accessing or using shower facilities.189  In United States v. 
Georgia (Goodman),190  the U.S. Supreme Court assumed without deciding 
that lack of disability accessible shower and toilet facilities were among the 
Eighth Amendment violations experienced by the plaintiff.191  The 
Petitioner’s brief in the case indicates that the plaintiff was unable to 
shower for over two years.192 
Plaintiffs also receive injunctive relief in cases when courts draw 
environment-frames to include other areas of a prison outside a cell. In 
186. Id. at *9. This was, however, the modification the plaintiff sought with respect to 
his verbal and motor tics. Id. 
187. See generally Outlaw v. City of Dothan, No. CV-92-A-1219-S, 1993 WL 735802 
(M.D. Ala. Apr. 27, 1993). 
188. Id. at *4. 
189. See, e.g., Kiman v. N.H. Dep’t of Corr., 451 F.3d 274, 288 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding 
that plaintiff presented admissible evidence regarding his access to a shower chair and 
facilities, making summary judgment inappropriate); Schmidt v. Odell, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 
1032–33 (D. Kan. 1999) ("[T]here is a genuine issue of fact as to whether the defendants 
failed to make reasonable accommodation for plaintiff’s disability, including by . . . failing 
to timely provide a shower chair."); Kaufman v. Carter, 952 F. Supp. 520, 532–33 (D. Mich. 
1996) (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on evidence that the prison 
failed to provide plaintiff with a shower chair or accessible shower facilities); Saunders v. 
Horn, 959 F. Supp. 689, 698 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (allowing inmate to proceed on claim that the 
prison did not provide readily accessible bathroom and shower facilities). 
190. See generally United States v. Georgia (Goodman), 546 U.S. 151 (2006). 
191. Id. at 159. The Court did not declare which of the plaintiff’s claims violated Title 
II. Id. 
192. Brief for Petitioner Goodman at 3, Goodman, 546 U.S. at 151 (No. 04-1236), 
http://works.bepress.com/samuel_bagenstos/19/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). The Court takes note that Goodman "had been forced to 
sit in his own feces and urine while prison officials refused to assist him in cleaning up the 
waste." Goodman, 546 U.S. at 155. 
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Owens v. Chester County,193  plaintiff prisoner was allowed to use his 
crutches only in certain areas of the prison.194  The court held that the prison 
must make crutches available to the plaintiff "when appropriate," implying 
some areas of the prison need not be accessed.195  The court identified the 
dining area as an appropriate place of access.196  Prisoner access to a dining 
hall was also upheld in Crawford v. Indiana Department of Corrections.197 
In addition, courts may view Title II as requiring access to recreation 
areas.198 
Only the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have adopted an environment-
frame of most, if not an entire, prison. Within this broad environment-
frame, both circuits held that plaintiffs were entitled to the modification 
they sought. In Love v. Westville Correctional Center,199  a quadriplegic 
prisoner plaintiff housed in an infirmary claimed "he was unable to use the 
prison’s recreational facilities, its dining hall, the visitation facilities that 
were open to the general inmate population, and that he was unable to 
participate in [programs]" that were available in the main prison area.200 
The court upheld a decision for the plaintiff, finding that he was illegally 
denied access to a number of programs that were available in the main 
quarters of the prison but not the infirmary unit.201  Pierce v. County of 
Orange202  takes perhaps the broadest view of any prison access case. The 
county housed mobility and dexterity-impaired detainees in a separate jail 
and denied them access to various features of their cells and numerous areas 
of the jail, including common spaces such as showers, dining halls, and 
recreation areas.203  The court ordered that the jail remove barriers to cells, 
bathrooms, showers, exercise areas, day rooms, dining rooms, and other 
193. See generally Owens v. Chester Cnty., CIV. A. 97-1344, 2000 WL 116069 (E.D. 
Pa. Jan. 31, 2000). 
194. Id. at *9. 
195. Id. at *12. 
196. Id. at *12 n.8. 
197. Crawford v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 115 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1997), abrogated on 
other grounds by Erickson v. Bd. of Gov. of State Coll. & Univ. for N. Ill. Univ., 207 F.3d 
945 (7th Cir. 2000). 
198. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Odell, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1033 (D. Kan. 1999) (holding 
that plaintiff was entitled to access prison recreation areas). 
199. See generally Love v. Westville Corr. Ctr., 103 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 1996). 
200. Id. at 558–59. 
201. Id. at 560 (providing examples of church services, substance abuse programs, and 
college classes). 
202. Pierce v. Cnty. of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2008). 
203. Id. at 1214–20. 
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areas.204  Courts adopt a similar range of environment-frames when 
considering access to prison or jail services, programs, or activities that do 
not require modification of spaces. 
2. Requests for Other Modification 
When disabled inmates request modification that does not alter the 
physical environment of a prison or jail, courts apply a range of 
environment-frames measured relative to other inmates to determine access 
to services, programs, and activities. The DOJ regulations state that 
disabled inmates must have access "equal to that afforded other[] 
[inmates]."205  Environments are measured relative to an individual disabled 
inmate (a single facility), a particular facility’s inmate population (a single 
facility), or the inmate population of a region (prisons or jails in a region). 
Environment-frames within a single facility may vary in scope. When an 
inmate’s access to services is considered in isolation, the frame often does 
not extend much beyond that individual’s prison cell, whereas when a 
comparison is made to the services received by other prisoners, the 
environment considered usually includes more, if not all, of the prison. As 
with requests for structural modification, the smaller the environment-
frame, the more likely an inmate will be denied her requested modification. 
As the environment-frame becomes larger, so do an inmate’s chances for 
greater prison or jail access. 
Some courts consider an inmate’s access to services in isolation, rather 
than compared to other inmates. These courts employ the narrowest 
version of a single prison environment-frame for remedy purposes, and 
plaintiffs are denied injunctive relief. In Mason v. Correctional Medical 
Services, Inc.,206  the court held that a prisoner who went blind as an inmate 
had sufficient access to reading and other benefits when the prison provided 
him an inmate reader as well as access to a tape recorder.207  The plaintiff 
had requested professional instruction about how to complete daily tasks 
throughout the prison with his impairment and tools to enable him to use 
the library, including training in Braille or computer software that makes 
204. Id. at 1226. 
205. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State & Local Gov’t Servs., 28 
C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(ii) (2010). 
206. See generally Mason v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 559 F.3d 880 (8th Cir. 2009). 
207. Id. at 887. 
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written work audible.208  The court in Douglas v. Gusman209  held that a 
prison’s failure to provide a telephone typewriter device or closed 
captioning television to a deaf prisoner, while providing unlimited access to 
phones as well as television privileges to other prisoners, did not violate 
Title II of the ADA.210  Allowing the prisoner to make "one call in the 
daytime and one call in the evening, seven days a week for about six weeks, 
provided him with meaningful access to the telephone as a matter of 
law."211  
Several courts compare a plaintiff inmate’s situation with that of non-
disabled inmates in the same prison. Plaintiffs are granted requested 
modification under this broader construction of the single prison 
environment-frame. The Third Circuit held with respect to a deaf prisoner 
that "public entities [must] take ‘appropriate steps’ to ensure that 
communication with a disabled person is as effective as communication 
with others."212  A number of lower federal courts adopt a similar view. In 
Clarkson v. Coughlin,213  the court granted summary judgment to plaintiff 
prisoners who were hearing impaired because the prison did not provide 
them the same opportunity as non-disabled prisoners to participate in 
educational, vocational, and rehabilitative classes.214  The court noted that 
the prison excluded disabled inmates from twenty-six academic and 
vocational programs that were available to non-disabled inmates.215  In 
Garcia v. Taylor,216  the court held that summary judgment was not 
appropriate when the prison denied the plaintiff, who was hearing impaired, 
208. Id. at 887–88. 
209. See generally Douglas v. Gusman, 567 F. Supp. 2d 877 (E.D. La. 2008). 
210. Id. at 890. 
211. Id. 
212. Chisolm v. McManimon, 275 F.3d 315, 325 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing 
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State & Local Gov’t Servs., 28 C.F.R. 
§ 35.160(a) (1991)). The regulations were recently amended to state, "[a] public entity shall 
take appropriate steps to ensure that communication with applicants, participants, members 
of the public, and companions with disabilities are as effective as communications with 
others." Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State & Local Gov’t Servs., 28 
C.F.R. § 35.160(a) (2010). 
213. See generally Clarkson v. Coughlin, 898 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
214. Id. at 1038, 1047. 
215. Id. at 1047. 
216. See generally Garcia v. Taylor, No. 4:07-cv-474-SPM/WCS, 2009 WL 2496521 
(N.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 2009). 
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access to the purchase and use of a personal radio device to listen to 
television like non-disabled inmates.217 
The court in Pierce, which involved structural as well as other 
modification requests, adopted an even broader environment-frame of the 
jails within that county.218  The court held that the county jail illegally 
denied inmates the benefit of educational, rehabilitative, and recreational 
programs; services; and activities available at other county jails to able-
bodied inmates.219  Other courts have rejected this broad environment-frame 
of prisons or jails in the region, however, by arguing that there is no right 
"for a [disabled] inmate to demand that the prison . . . implement a specific 
type of [service, program, or activity] which is not already available [nor 
does the ADA] create any right for an inmate to be housed at a specific 
prison [where such opportunities are available]."220 
The Pierce and Baribeau cases stand in stark contrast and demonstrate 
the significant role of environment-framing in determining access to prison 
environments, services, and programs for disabled inmates. In Baribeau 
(discussed in Part III.A.1), providing a mobility-impaired inmate with an 
ADA compliant cell was deemed a sufficient modification.221  In Pierce, the 
court provided plaintiffs with access to a broad range of services and 
programs available to non-disabled inmates within the county.222  As with 
other reasonable accommodation or modification cases, the breadth of the 
environment-frame chosen by courts in the prison and jail cases determines 
judicial outcomes, with favorable plaintiff decisions resulting from use of 
broad environment-frames. 
C. Harms of Current Approach to Assessing Environment: Remedy and 
Possible Constitutional Implications 
As the prison and jail cases indicate, when courts frame environments 
for modification purposes narrowly, plaintiffs are often unable to obtain a 
remedy. This suggests that lowering the threshold for disability eligibility 
alone will not address lack of protections for individuals with disabilities. 
217. Id. at *11. 
218. Pierce v. Cnty. of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1221 (9th Cir. 2008). 
219. Id. at 1220–21, 1226. 
220. Garrett v. Angelone, 940 F. Supp. 933, 942 (W.D. Va. 1996), aj’d, 107 F.3d 865 
(4th Cir. 1997). 
221. Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 484 (8th Cir. 2010). 
222. Pierce, 526 F.3d at 1220–21, 1247. 
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Interestingly, existing law and the DOJ regulations do not appear to 
support some narrow environment-frames for remedy. The DOJ 
regulations for Title II, for example, indicate that a qualified individual with 
a disability must have "an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the 
aid, benefit, or service that is . . . equal to that afforded others."223  This 
standard is not met in instances where an individual is provided access only 
to her prison cell, due to structural or other barriers. Further, an argument 
could be made under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead v. 
Zimrig,224  that a prisoner who is unable to leave her cell is "unjustifiably 
isolated."225  In fact in Garcia, the court held that while every television 
must not be closed captioned and accessible to a deaf prisoner, the 
accessible televisions cannot place the plaintiff in "unjustified isolation."226 
Narrow environment-frames in the remedy context may also have 
constitutional implications. Briefly stated, clarification of environment-
frames could help determine the limits of the ADA’s (Title II) abrogation of 
state sovereign immunity. Currently, the boundaries of this abrogation are 
unclear under U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. Under the ADA, failure 
to provide reasonable accommodation or other modification constitutes 
discrimination.227  ADA discrimination on the basis of disability entails a 
"broader swath of conduct" than the conduct prohibited by the 
Constitution.228  Determining the relevant environment-frame for injunctive 
relief would help establish how much conduct lies outside Constitutional 
mandates and does not warrant the abrogation of state sovereign immunity. 
This might be significant, as it is possible that the uncertain breadth of 
injunctive relief under the ADA has limited the Court’s willingness to 
interpret more broadly the overlap of the ADA with Constitutional 
mandates. The Court has abrogated state sovereign immunity only in 
223. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State & Local Gov’t Servs., 28 
C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(ii) (2010). 
224. See generally Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
225. Id. at 600–01. 
226. See Garcia v. Taylor, No. 4:07-cv-474-SPM/WCS, 2009 WL 2496521 at *11 
(N.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 2009) (considering "whether the proscription of discrimination may 
require placement of persons with mental disabilities in community settings rather than in 
institutions" (citing Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600–01)). 
227. ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, 12132, 12182 (2006). 
228. United States v. Georgia (Goodman), 546 U.S. 151, 160 (2006) (Stevens, J., 
concurring); see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533 n.24 (2004) (quoting Kimel v. 
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000)). 
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limited contexts including courthouse229  and prison inaccessibility, the latter 
rising to the level of Eighth Amendment violations.230 
Thus, courts should clarify the size of environment-frames in the 
remedy context for several reasons. First, clarification will promote legal 
consistency. Second, narrower environment-frames undermine disability 
remedies and should not be used without deliberate selection. Third, a 
better understanding of the injunctive relief available under the ADA will 
inform courts and litigants about the overlap between the ADA and 
Constitutional protections. 
The next Part addresses the impact of the ADA Amendments Act of 
2008 on issues of environment-framing.231  The AAA seeks to expand 
disability protections by lowering the threshold for protected class 
232 membership. While the AAA does not address remedy, it may indirectly 
affect it. Enlarging the protected class may alter the remedies courts are 
233 willing to provide under an unfunded mandate. Thus, depending on the 
implications of the AAA for class eligibility purposes, environment-
framing may continue to limit disability protections at both the eligibility 
and remedy stages of disability analysis after the AAA. 
IV. Limitations of ADA Amendments Act of 2008 
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (AAA) became effective January 1, 
234 2009. 	In general terms, the Act seeks to expand the class of individuals 
235 eligible for disability protections. 	A rule of construction within the Act 
states that "disability . . . shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of 
229. Lane, 541 U.S. at 533. 
230. Goodman, 546 U.S. at 159. 
231. See generally AAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006)). 
232. Id. § 2(b), 122 Stat. at 3554. 
233. I use "unfunded mandate" only in a descriptive manner to indicate that, as the 
ADA is currently structured, covered entities are responsible for making most 
accommodation and other modification. As I argue in other work, however, disability is part 
of the human condition, and responding to it should be both a governmental and a social 
obligation. See generally Satz, Overcoming Fragmentation, supra note 18, at 513; Ani B. 
Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination, 83 WASH. L. REV. 513 
(2008) [hereinafter Satz, Disability]. Laws routinely impose costs to benefit the public 
welfare in other contexts, including everything from building codes to vehicle emissions 
inspections. 
234. AAA § 8, 122 Stat. at 3559. 
235. Id. § 2(b), 122 Stat. at 3554. 
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individuals . . . to the maximum extent permitted [under the AAA]."236  The 
AAA, like the original ADA, does not directly address environment-frames. 
To date, few courts have decided cases under the AAA.237  Most cases 
occurring after the AAA’s enactment involve actions that took place prior 
to the effective date of the amendments.238  Courts deciding these cases 
have held that the AAA does not apply retroactively239  under Landgraf v. 
USI Film Products,240  or they have argued that the AAA and the original 
236. Id. § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555–56. 
237. Jenkins v. Nat’l Bd. Med. Exam’rs, No. 08-5371, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 2660, at 
*1–2 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2009); Koenig v. Maryland, No. CCB-09-3288, 2010 WL 148706, at 
*1 (D. Md. Jan. 13, 2010); Pridgen v. Dep’t of Pub. Works, No. WDQ-08-2826, 2009 WL 
4726619, at *4–5 (D. Md. Dec. 1, 2009); Chiesa v. N.Y. Dep’t of Labor, 638 F. Supp. 2d 
316, 321 (N.D.N.Y. 2009); Green v. Am. Univ., 647 F. Supp. 2d 21, 29 (D.D.C. 2009); 
Kemppaninen v. Aransas Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. C-08-194, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52914, at 
*3–4 (S.D. Tex. June 23, 2009); Collier v. Austin Peay State Univ., NO. 3:08-0400, 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67363, at *21–25 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 20, 2009); Menchaca v. Maricopa 
Cmty. Coll. Dist., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1068 (D. Ariz. 2009). 
238. Fikes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 322 F. App’x 882, 883 n.1 (11th Cir. 2009); Rohr v. Salt 
River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 2009); 
Verhoff v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 299 F. App’x 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2009); EEOC v. Agro 
Dist., LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 469 n.8 (5th Cir. 2009); Moore v. Wal-Mart Stores East L.P., No. 
7:07-CV-193(HL), 2009 WL 3109823, at *7 n.6 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 23, 2009); Franchi v. New 
Hampton Sch., 656 F. Supp. 2d 252, 258–59 (D.N.H. 2009); Hammond v. Dep’t. Veteran 
Affairs, No. 08-10922, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66296, at *23 (E.D. Mich. July 30, 2009); 
Young v. Precision Metal Prods., Inc., 599 F. Supp. 2d 216, 223–24 (D. Conn. 2009); 
Wisbey v. City of Lincoln, No. 4:09CV3093, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30819, at *22 n.4 (D. 
Neb. 2009), aff’d, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 13684 (8th Cir. 2010); Pacenza v. IBM Corp., No. 
04 Civ. 5831 (PGG), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29778, at *26–27 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 
2009); Bennett v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 315 S.W.3d 832, 842 n.8 (Ct. App. Tenn. 2009); 
Brown v. Bd. of Regents Okla. Agric. & Mech. Coll. for Langston Univ., No. CIV-07-1240-  
C, 2009 WL 467754, at *2 n.2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 24, 2009); Menchaca v. Maricopa Cmty. 
Coll. Dist., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1071 (D. Ariz. 2009); Braun v. Securitas Sec. Serv. USA, 
Inc., No. 07 CV 02198(SJF)(WDW), 2009 WL 150937, at *4 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2009). 
239. Fikes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 322 F. App’x 882, 883 n.1 (11th Cir. 2009); Milholland v. 
Sumner Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 569 F.3d 562, 563 (6th Cir. 2009); EEOC v. Agro Dist., LLC, 555 
F.3d 462, 469 n.8 (5th Cir. 2009); Lytes v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 572 F.3d 936, 939– 
42 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Young v. Precision Metal Prods., Inc., 599 F. Supp. 2d 216, 223–24 (D. 
Conn. 2009); Grizzle v. Macon Cnty., No. 5:08-CV-164(CAR), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
73769, at *13 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 20, 2009); Bennett v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 315 S.W.3d 832, 
842 n.8 (Ct. App. Tenn. 2009). But see generally Jenkins v. Nat’l Bd. Med. Exam’rs, No. 
08-5371, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 2660, at *1–2 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2009); Menchaca v. 
Maricopa Cmty. Coll. Dist., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1068 (D. Ariz. 2009). 
240. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265, 270, 273 (1994) (holding that 
courts should not apply new law to previous events absent clear Congressional intent, unless 
the action at stake pertains to prospective relief). 
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ADA would produce the same result, avoiding the need to decide whether 
the AAA could be applied.241  
This Part examines the potential impact of the AAA on environment-
framing. I argue that the plain language of the Act, the proposed EEOC 
regulations, and the cases applying the AAA to date, indicate that it is 
unlikely that the AAA will affect the environments in which courts choose 
to evaluate an individual for disability. This is significant because 
environment-framing may prove the easiest way to undermine the purpose 
of the AAA. 
A. Broadening the Protected Class Without Regard to Environment 
The AAA and proposed EEOC regulations do not address 
environment-frames directly. The AAA seeks to increase eligibility for the 
protected class for actual disability242  by assessing an individual for 
disability prior to mitigating measures,243  expanding the types of major life 
activities that may qualify an individual as disabled,244  and lowering the 
241. Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850, 853 
(9th Cir. 2009); George v. TJX Co., Inc., No. 08 CV 275(ARR)(LB), 2009 WL 4718840, at 
*9 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2009); Moore v. Wal-Mart Stores East L.P., No. 7:07-CV-193(HL), 
2009 WL 3109823, at *7 n.6 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 23, 2009); Franchi v. New Hampton Sch., 656 
F. Supp. 2d 252, 259 (D.N.H. 2009); Hammond v. Dep’t. Veteran Affairs, No. 08-10922, 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66296, at *23 (E.D. Mich. July 30, 2009); Brodsky v. New England 
Sch. of Law, 617 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D. Mass. 2009); Wisbey v. City of Lincoln, No. 
4:09CV3093, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30819, at *22 n.4 (D. Neb. 2009); Pacenza v. IBM 
Corp., No. 04 Civ. 5831 (PGG), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29778, at *26–27 n. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 2, 2009); Brown v. Bd. of Regents Okla. Agric. & Mech. Coll. for Langston Univ., No. 
CIV-07-1240-C, 2009 WL 467754, at *2 n.2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 24, 2009); Braun v. Securitas 
Sec. Serv. USA, Inc., No. 07 CV 02198(SJF)(WDW), 2009 WL 150937, at *4 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 20, 2009). 
242. The Act applies the same standard to "record" of disability. AAA, Pub. L. No. 
110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555–56 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006)). 
Individuals "regarded as" disabled no longer need to demonstrate limitation of a major life 
activity for real or perceived impairments. Id. 
243. See id. § 2(b)(2), 122 Stat. at 3554 (stating a purpose of the amendments as: "to 
reject the [standard] . . . that whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity 
is to be determined with reference to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures"). 
244. See id. § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555–56 (discussing major life activities). The AAA 
provides a broad, non-exhaustive list of major life activities. Id. Functional impairments 
affecting major life activities may now be episodic, or an individual may be in remission. 
Id. The AAA codifies that certain activities, such as "communicating" and "major bodily 
functions," are major life activities. Id. The AAA also makes clear that in order to qualify 
for the protected class, an individual does not need to demonstrate that an impairment affects 
more than one major life activity. Id. 
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standard for demonstrating a "substantial limitation" of a major life 
activity.245  The first two changes on their face do not affect environment-
framing. Examining an individual prior to mitigating measures does not 
speak to the environment in which her impairment is assessed. Similarly, 
expanding the range of major life activities that qualify under the ADA 
does not address the environment in which to assess their impact on 
functioning.246  This Part will focus on the third change: loosening the 
standard for what constitutes an impairment that "substantially limits" a 
major life activity. I argue that this alteration affects environment-framing 
only under an interpretation of the AAA that federal courts have already 
failed to adopt. 
1. Lowering the Threshold for "Substantially Limits" 
The AAA lowers the burden articulated in Toyota v. Williams247  and 
the EEOC regulations for showing a "substantial limitation" of a major 
life activity.248  The potential impact of this change on environment-
framing is not immediately clear, given certain ambiguities in the 
statute. This Section examines these ambiguities and argues that under 
each possible reading of the AAA, the Act is unlikely to influence 
environment-framing. Further, recent jurisprudence construing the 
statute indicates that the lower threshold for "substantially limits" is 
unlikely to affect environment-frames employed by courts. 
The AAA lowers the threshold for "substantially limits" by 
abandoning the test articulated in Toyota that "an individual must have 
an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from 
doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily 
lives."249  The language is ambiguous as to whether Congress is rejecting 
only that individuals must be "severely restrict[ed]" with respect to tasks 
245. Id. § 2(b)(4)–(6), 122 Stat. at 3554. 
246. The AAA expands the major life activities to be assessed within any environment. 
Id. § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555–56. 
247. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002) ("We 
therefore hold that to be substantially limited in performing manual tasks, an individual must 
have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities 
that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives."). 
248. See AAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(4), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 (2008) (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2010)) (rejecting the Supreme Court’s Toyota standard for finding a 
disability under the ADA). 
249. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 198; AAA § 2(b)(4), 122 Stat. at 3554. 
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that are central to most people’s daily lives, or whether it is also 
rejecting consideration of the tasks themselves as major life activities.250 
It seems unlikely that the AAA seeks to eliminate consideration of 
tasks that are of "central importance to most people’s daily lives" as 
major life activities. The thrust of the Act is to expand coverage for 
individuals with impairments.251  Further, the Act codifies many tasks as 
major life activities that pertain to daily living, including caring for 
oneself, performing manual tasks, eating, and sleeping.252  In addition, 
Congressional testimony on the subject focuses entirely on the 
difficulties imposed by a strict standard for "substantial limitation." To 
the extent that Congressional testimony mentions the tasks themselves, 
the concern is either narrow construction of "major" in "major life 
activity"—i.e., focusing on a limited rather than a broad set of activities 
that are "major life activities"253—or that individuals who are able to 
250. The AAA states that: 
The purposes of this Act are . . . (4) to reject the standards enunciated by the 
Supreme Court in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 
U.S. 184 (2002) . . . that to be substantially limited in performing a major life 
activity under the ADA "an individual must have an impairment that prevents or 
severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central 
importance to most people’s daily lives." 
AAA § 2(b)(4), 122 Stat. at 3554. The AAA then states that Congress intends: 
(5) to convey Congressional intent that the standard created by the Supreme 
Court in the case of Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 
534 U.S. 184 (2002) for "substantially limits," and applied by lower courts in 
numerous decisions, has created an inappropriately high level of limitation 
necessary to obtain coverage under the ADA, to convey that it is the intent of 
Congress that the primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA 
should be whether entities covered under the ADA have complied with their 
obligations, and to convey that the question of whether an individual’s 
impairment is a disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis; 
and (6) to express Congress’ expectation that the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission will revise that portion of its current regulations that 
defines the term "substantially limits" as "significantly restricted" to be 
consistent with this Act, including the amendments made by this Act. 
Id. § 2 (b)(5)–(6), 122 Stat. at 3554. 
251. Id. § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555–56. 
252. Id. 
253. The ADA Restoration Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 3195 Before the Subcomm. on 
Constitution, Civil Rights & Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 
71 (2007) [hereinafter ADA Hearing 2007] (statement of Ms. Chai R. Feldblum, Professor, 
Georgetown University Law Center and current Commissioner of the EEOC) ("The 
Supreme Court, in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, ruled that the 
words ‘substantially limits’ and ‘major life activities’ in the definition disability ‘need to be 
interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled.’"). "This was 
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fulfill certain daily tasks should not automatically be disqualified as 
disabled in performing other tasks.254 
Regardless of whether the AAA is interpreted to mean a rejection of a 
strict standard for "substantially limits" alone, or a rejection of that standard 
combined with a rejection of certain daily tasks as major life activities, the 
Act will likely not affect environment-framing under the disability 
threshold test. If Congress intended only to alter the interpretation of 
"substantially limits" as "preventing or severely restricting" a major life 
activity,255  the AAA does not relate to environment-framing but rather to 
the degree to which impairment impacts a major life activity. Under the 
contrary to the various statements in the legislative history indicating an assumption that the 
definition of disability would be interpreted broadly." Id. "As a result of this ruling, people 
alleging discrimination must now show that their impairments prevent or severely restrict 
them from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives." Id.; 
The ADA Restoration Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 3195 Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & 
Labor, 110th Cong. 64 (2008) [hereinafter ADA Hearing 2008] (statement of Mr. Andrew J. 
Imparato, President and Chief Executive officer of the American Association of People with 
Disabilities) ("It was the Toyota v. Williams decision that really severely restricted what 
constitutes a substantial limitation and a major life activity. The court said that they had to 
be activities that were of central importance to most people’s daily lives."); ADA Hearing 
2007, supra, at 38 (statement of Mr. Michael C. Collins, Executive Director of the National 
Council on Disability) ("The phrase ‘of central importance to most people’s daily lives’ has 
led to extensive questioning by courts about each individual’s ability to brush his or her 
teeth, bathe, dress, stand, sit, lift, eat, sleep and interact with others."). "It has led to contrary 
rulings by federal courts about whether activities such as communicating, driving, 
gardening, crawling, jumping, learning, shopping in the mall, performing house work, and 
even working and living are ‘major life activities.’" Id. 
254. See, e.g., ADA Hearing 2008, supra note 253, at 12 (statement of Mr. Andrew J. 
Imparato, President and Chief Executive Officer of the American Association of People with 
Disabilities) ("Citing the Williams case, the 11th Circuit . . . use[d] evidence about Mr. 
Littleton’s ability to drive and be interviewed for a job against him on the issue of 
disability . . . . Do we want to send . . . the message that you should be careful not to achieve 
your full potential, be careful not to live as independently as possible, or you may lose your 
federal civil rights protections[?]"). 
While performing daily living tasks may be indicia of functioning relevant to a major 
life activity, an ability to complete such tasks does not preclude a substantial limitation of a 
major life activity. The AAA in fact clarifies that an individual needs to demonstrate 
limitation of only one major life activity. See AAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 
3553, 3555–56 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006)) ("An impairment that 
substantially limits one major life activity need not limit other major life activities in order to 
be considered a disability."). 
255. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 2(a)(8) (2006) (finding the "severely restricts" language of 
Toyota inconsistent with Congressional intent); supra notes 247–49 (discussing Toyota); see 
also Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002) ("That 
[‘substantially limits’ and ‘major’ in ‘major life activities’] need to be interpreted strictly to 
create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled is confirmed by the first section of 
the ADA."). 
FRAGMENTED LIVES 	 231 
AAA, plaintiffs will now face a less burdensome threshold for showing a 
substantial limitation of a major life activity, whatever the environment 
chosen for assessment. This is the view taken by the Sixth Circuit in the 
first Court of Appeals decision applying the AAA: "Congress overturned 
the definition of ‘substantially limits’ put forward in Toyota . . . . The 
district court [wrongfully] concluded that Jenkins would only qualify for 
protection under the ADA if his disability ‘precluded’ him from performing 
reading tasks of that were ‘central to most people’s daily lives.’"256 
The view that the AAA lessens the "substantial limitation" threshold 
without regard to environment is also supported by the proposed EEOC 
regulations. Previously, the regulations considered the "condition, manner, 
or duration" of a major life activity in assessing its severity.257  "Condition" 
could have been interpreted by courts to pertain to environment. While 
courts did not interpret "condition" in this manner, the AAA provided an 
opportunity for Congress (and subsequently the EEOC) to do so. Instead, 
the EEOC struck the language from the regulations so as "not to be 
misconstrued to require the ‘level of limitation, and the intensity of focus,’ 
applied [to "substantially limits"]."258 
If Congress is also rejecting consideration of major life activities that 
are of "central importance to most people’s daily lives," it is still unlikely 
that the AAA speaks to environment-framing. Under this view, courts 
would no longer be concerned with functioning pertaining to a particular set 
of daily activities. Congress clearly rejected the holding in Toyota that 
major life activities must be activities of "central importance" to daily 
living.259  This fails, however, to address the broader role of daily activities 
in disability analysis. Either the activities are not required but may be 
considered, or Congress intended to exclude a certain set of daily activities 
256. Jenkins v. Nat’l Bd. Med. Exam’rs, No. 08-5371, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 2660, at 
*2 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2009) (emphasis added). 
257. See Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA, 29 
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2010) ("The term substantially limits means . . . [s]ignificantly 
restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a 
particular major life activity."). This language does not appear in the DOJ regulations 
interpreting Titles II and III. 
258. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 48444, 48446 (proposed Sept. 23, 2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630). 
259. See AAA § 2(b)(4), 122 Stat. at 3554 ("[This Act’s purpose is] to reject the 
[Supreme Court’s standard] . . . that to be substantially limited in performing a major life 
activity . . . ‘an individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the 
individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily 
lives.’"). 
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from disability analysis altogether. Under either reading, the activities 
could be assessed in any environment. Daily living tasks like teeth 
brushing, showering, dressing, etc., need not take place in the home 
environment. 
The only interpretation of the AAA that would speak directly to 
environment-framing would be that the rejection of the Toyota standard 
means that major life activities must not be measured in every environment 
in which they occur—e.g., a broad environment that includes both a 
person’s home and work environment. This interpretation seems possible 
under the proposed EEOC regulations: "An individual whose impairment 
substantially limits a major life activity need not also demonstrate a 
limitation in the ability to perform activities of central importance to daily 
life."260  One of the examples states, "[s]omeone with a 20-pound lifting 
restriction that is not of short-term duration is substantially limited in 
lifting, and need not also show that he is unable to perform activities of 
daily living that require lifting in order to be considered substantially 
limited in lifting."261  Under this construction of the AAA, courts could 
asses an individual with respect to the major life activity of "lifting" in a 
narrow environment, i.e., at work, rather than in an environment that 
includes both home and work. 
These regulations arguably extend beyond the AAA, however, which 
seeks to expand the definition of disability, not contract the environment in 
which people are assessed for disability.262  Further, cases decided after the 
AAA indicate that a broad environment-frame will remain for assessing 
major life activities. In Rohr v. Salt River Project,263  the Ninth Circuit 
260. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA, 74 Fed. 
Reg. at 48440. 
261. Id. (Ex. 1). A second example is also provided: "Someone with monocular vision 
whose depth perception or field of vision would be substantially limited . . . need not also 
show that he is unable to perform activities of central importance to daily life that require 
seeing in order to be substantially limited in seeing." Id. (Ex. 2). This narrow interpretation 
of environment is further illustrated in the proposed regulations discussing the major life 
activity of "working." Id. at 48442. An individual’s impairment may substantially limit her 
in the major life activity of "working," even if the same impairment does not limit her 
activities as compared to most people outside the workplace. Id. 
262. Other scholars note that the proposed EEOC regulations extend beyond the statute. 
Laura Rothstein, Address at the SEALS Annual Meeting: Higher Education and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act—A Review and Preview (July 31, 2010) (unpublished 
lecture); see also Laura Rothstein, Strategic Advocacy in Fulfilling the Goals of Disability 
Policy: Is the Only Question How Full the Glass Is?, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 403, 403–12 
(2008) (presenting similar arguments with respect to proposals to amend the ADA). 
263. See Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850, 
864 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing but not applying AAA, which became law while the case 
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indicated in dicta that: "The Supreme Court has made clear that the 
substantial limitation inquiry is not limited to the effects of the impairment 
in the workplace . . . . Rather, the proper inquiry is whether the physical 
impairment substantially limits the claimed major life activity in daily 
life."264  The court goes on to address the AAA’s effect on the Toyota test in 
terms of lowering the threshold for what constitutes a "substantial" 
limitation, with no discussion of the Act altering the "daily life," or broad 
environment component.265  The "daily lives" language is also embraced by 
other courts that discuss (but do not apply) the AAA.266  Some cases 
decided after the AAA assume but do not discuss a broad environment-
frame that would be consistent with the "daily lives" component of the 
267 Toyota test. 
In addition, while the narrow environment-frames for major life 
activities proposed by the EEOC may solve the problem with current 
(broad) environment-framing limiting eligibility for the protected class, 
they perpetuate a view of disability that is fragmented and artificial. 
Fragmentation occurs because the actual experience of living with a 
disability differs from the legally recognized one. An individual’s 
impairment is treated as if it exists only within certain contexts, such as the 
workplace or particular places of public accommodation. In reality, 
however, an impairment may impact an individual’s ability to function in 
other situations, and those limitations may in turn impact her ability to 
maintain employment or to participate within the civic or social realms. 
For example, an individual’s ability to perform manual tasks in a timely 
manner at home, such as meal preparation, laundry, and dependent care, 
may affect whether she is able to work.268  Similarly, an individual who 
was pending). 
264. Id. at 858 n.5 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
265. Id. at 861. 
266. See Grizzle v. Macon Cnty., Ga., No. 5:08-CV-164, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
73769, at *19 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 20, 2009) ("[M]ajor life activities are broadly defined as those 
that are of central importance to daily life and ‘that the average person in the general 
population can perform with little or no difficulty.’"). 
267. See Moen v. Genesee Cnty. Friend of the Ct., No. 2:08-cv-12824, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 57177, at *16 (E.D. Mich. July 6, 2009) (referring to an "active lifestyle" with 
respect to a question about substantial limitation in the major life activity of walking); 
Menchaca v. Maricopa Cmty. Coll. Dist, 2595 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1069 (D. Ariz. 2009) 
(describing various major life activities including "interacting with others" as affecting 
personal and work relationships); Franchi v. New Hampton Sch., 656 F. Supp. 2d 252, 255 
(D.N.H. 2009) (discussing an eating disorder as affecting life inside and outside boarding 
school). 
268. Sam Bagenstos has authored an important body of work discussing the need for 
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does not have reliable transportation to otherwise physically accessible 
buildings may not have access to the services or opportunities available 
within those facilities. As I argue in Part V, it is important to adopt a 
holistic view of disability to determine eligibility and remedy; otherwise, 
protections will be sporadic. Thus, I will argue that in the eligibility 
context the problem is not with a broad environment-frame per se, but with 
the manner in which courts currently interpret that frame. Further, as 
discussed below, for some major life activities, such as "working," an 
environment-frame that is too narrow may further confound disability 
eligibility analysis by failing to provide guidance to courts about whom to 
exclude from the protected class. 
2. "Substantially Limits" and the Major Life Activity of "Working" 
Not only does the AAA fail to clarify the relevant environment for 
assessing the major life activity of "working," the proposed EEOC 
regulations supporting the Act arguably exacerbate existing problems of 
environment-framing. As discussed in Part II.B, the major life activity of 
"working" is the only area where the EEOC and courts interpreting the 
regulations previously sought to define the relevant environment for 
assessing individuals’ functional impairments. When assessing whether an 
individual was "substantially limited," courts considered "the geographical 
area to which the individual has reasonable access . . . and the number and 
types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills, or abilities within 
that geographical area from which the individual is also disqualified 
because of the impairment."269  While the AAA does not alter this 
approach,270  the EEOC has interpreted the Act’s general mandate to 
material supports to address disability discrimination. SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE 
CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT chs. 7–8 (2009); Samuel R. 
Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 59–70 (2004) [hereinafter 
Bagenstos, Future]. Bagenstos discusses what he terms the "access/content" distinction in 
disability law, namely, individuals with disabilities have access to the same benefits as 
individuals who are not disabled, though the content of the benefits is not altered to meet the 
needs of individuals with disabilities. Bagenstos, Future, supra, at 35. In an insightful 
article, Michael Waterstone explores the benefits of material supports provided to disabled 
veterans under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act. 
Michael E. Waterstone, Returning Veterans and Disability Law, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1081, 1109–10 (2010). 
269. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA, 29 
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B)–(C) (2010). 
270. See AAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555–56 (2008) (codified 
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construe the definition of disability "broad[ly] . . . to the maximum extent 
permitted"271  as requiring the elimination of the geographic (environment) 
requirement.272 
Under the proposed EEOC regulations, individuals need not show 
substantial limitation in a "class of jobs" or a "broad range of jobs in 
various classes" within a certain region, but only that they are limited in a 
"type of work" based on the ability of an individual to perform a job as 
compared to most people with similar skills and training.273  The underlying 
though unstated assumption is that the broad environment embraced by 
courts undermined eligibility for protected class membership. One way 
around this problem would be to interpret the availability of other jobs in 
the geographic region as probative, rather than dispositive, of functionality. 
The EEOC instead eliminated the geographic requirement. The proposed 
regulations also imply that a particular place of employment is not the 
legally-relevant environment.274  As a result, the regulations provide no 
guidance to courts about the environment in which to assess "type of work." 
In fact one could argue that if the environment is not a particular workplace 
or a group of workplaces in the region, no environment exists in which to 
assess the major life activity of "working." 
Thus, the AAA is unlikely to affect environment-framing, unless 
courts defer to the EEOC regulations with respect to workplace analysis 
(and exclude consideration of the effect of major life activities at home) or 
the major life activity of "working" specifically (and eliminate the 
geographic requirement). Courts have already indicated an unwillingness 
at 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006)) ("The term ‘substantially limits’ shall be interpreted 
consistently with the findings and purposes of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008."). 
271. Id. 
272. See Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA, 74 
Fed. Reg. 48431, 48448 (proposed Sept. 23, 2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630) 
("[T]he specific factors in the prior regulation . . . have been eliminated, including the 
geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access . . . or abilities within that 
geographical area from which the individual is also disqualified because of the 
impairment."). 
273. See id. at 48447 ("The terms ‘class of jobs’ and ‘broad range of jobs in various 
classes’ . . . have been eliminated, and replaced with ‘type of work’ . . . [in] which the 
individual is substantially limited when compared to most people having similar training, 
skills, and abilities . . . ."). 
274. See id. ("A type of work includes the job the individual has been performing or for 
which he is applying, and jobs that have qualifications or job-related requirements which the 
individual would be substantially limited in performing as a result of the impairment." 
(emphasis added)). 
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to adopt the former view.275  Adopting the latter position would confuse 
judicial analysis by effectively removing all possible environment-frames 
from consideration for the major life activity of "working." As the next 
Subpart discusses, Congress’s failure to address environment-framing 
directly in the AAA could undermine the Act’s purpose to expand disability 
protections. Courts may continue to manipulate environment-frames to 
reach desired judicial outcomes with respect to disability eligibility and 
remedy. 
B. The Environment-Frame Loophole and the Potential to 
Undermine the AAA 
The AAA’s failure to address environment-frames may prove 
significant, as courts struggle to implement the new, broader definition of 
disability under the auspices of unfunded mandates for reasonable 
accommodation and other modification.276  In this Subpart, I briefly discuss 
three possible judicial responses to this problem—constricting remedy, 
strictly interpreting "essential functions,"277  and manipulating the 
environment-frame. While all three would allow an end-run around the 
AAA, I argue that the environment-frame limitation may be the most 
concerning. 
One possibility for courts to control expenditures for disability 
accommodation or other modification is to construe even more narrowly 
remedies under Titles I–III.278  Most notably, the "undue hardship"279 
defense could play a significant role in remedy reduction. A disabled 
individual does not suffer illegal discrimination when an employer or other 
entity fails to make a modification that imposes an "undue hardship."280 
Under Title I, an accommodation that causes "undue hardship" is one that 
"requir[es] significant difficulty or expense" measured relative to other 
employees and the financial resources of relevant facilities.281  "Undue 
hardship" is an amorphous concept, with the EEOC regulations simply 
275. Supra Part IV.A.2. 
276. See supra note 233 (discussing the use of "unfunded mandate"). 
277. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2006). 
278. Remedy provisions include: Id. § 12117(a) (Title I); § 12133 (Title II); § 12188(a) 
(Title III). The AAA does not alter the ADA with respect to remedies. 
279. Id. § 12111(10)(A)–(B). 
280. Id. 
281. Id. 
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restating the scant statutory requirements,282  and the EEOC Interpretive 
Guidance offering only that an accommodation need not be "unduly 
costly."283  This financial-based understanding of "undue hardship" is 
imported into Titles II and III with respect to injunctive relief. Under Title 
II, public services need not be altered if they impose an "undue hardship" or 
require a "fundamental alteration" of a "service, program, or activity."284 
Similarly, under Title III, alterations to existing structures must be "readily 
achievable"285  and not require "much difficulty or expense."286  These 
hardship-related defenses could, under current law, be construed broadly to 
preclude remedies for new members of the protected class. One could 
consider such injunctive relief and undue hardship as "two sides of the 
same coin": Expansion of what constitutes undue hardship will limit 
reasonable accommodation or other modification and vice versa.287 
Another option for reducing expenditures is to restrict the protected 
class by focusing on the "qualified individual" component of who is a 
"qualified individual with a disability."288  After an individual demonstrates 
a statutorily protected disability, she must identify an accommodation or 
other modification to promote access.289  To be a "qualified individual" 
under Title I, one must be capable of performing the essential functions of 
her job "with or without reasonable accommodation."290  Under Titles II 
and III, an individual must be able to access services and buildings, 
respectively, once reasonable modification is made.291  Restricting who is 
considered a "qualified individual" may be done in a number of ways. 
282. See Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA, 29 
C.F.R. § 1630.2(p) (2010) ("Undue hardship—(1) In general. Undue hardship means, with 
respect to the provision of an accommodation, significant difficulty or expense incurred by a 
covered entity."). 
283. Id. § 1630 app. 
284. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(ii)–(iii) (2006). 
285. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). 
286. See id. § 12181(9) ("The term ‘readily achievable’ means easily accomplishable 
and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense."). The factors that a court 
considers include "the nature and cost of the action . . . the overall financial resources of the 
facility . . . the overall financial resources of the covered entity . . . and the [nature] of [the] 
operation . . . ." Id. 
287. See, e.g., Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 62 
FLA. L. REV. 1119, 1148 (2010) ("The legislative sources make clear that reasonable 





ADA § 12111(8). 
Id. §§ 12113(a), 12131, 12182(b)(2)(v). 
Id. § 12111(8). 
Id. §§ 12131, 12182(b)(2)(v). 
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Under Title I, courts could construe the "essential functions"292  requirement 
more narrowly. Courts could give greater deference to informal or evolving 
employer descriptions about what are the essential functions of a particular 
job. Employers could construct job descriptions in a manner that precludes 
an individual with a disability from performing necessary tasks effectively, 
with or without a reasonable accommodation. Under all three titles, courts 
could lower the standard for a defendant to demonstrate lack of an effective 
reasonable modification for a disability to the point where no modification 
would be viewed as improving access. A defendant who fails to make an 
alteration when it would not improve employment eligibility293  or access to 
services294  or public spaces is acting legally.295 
Alternatively, courts may restrict the protected class by continuing to 
use broad environment-frames and subjecting them to traditional analysis. 
Environment-framing is perhaps the most troubling hurdle to the AAA for 
several reasons. 	First, unlike the "undue hardship,"296  "qualified 
individual,"297  and "essential functions" requirements,298  no judicial test 
exists for determining the relevant environment in which to assess the 
impact of an individual’s impairment. The only regulatory guidance is for 
the major life activity of "working," and the proposed EEOC regulations 
remove it.299  Second, historically courts have, without explanation or 
analysis, assumed environments that disfavor disability protections.300 
Third, AAA jurisprudence indicates environment-framing under the ADA 
will not change.301  As a result, the success of the AAA may rest in part on 
the whim of courts. To close this loophole, courts must actively address 
and define the relevant environment-frames for disability eligibility and 
remedy under the ADA. In the following Part, I propose a method for 
defining and interpreting these frames. 
292. Id. § 12111(8). 
293. Id. § 12113(a). 
294. Id. § 12131. 
295. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(v). 
296. Id. § 12111(10)(A)–(B). 
297. Id. §§ 12113(a), 12131, 12182(b)(2)(v). 
298. Id. § 12111(8). 
299. Supra Part IV.A.2. 
300. Supra Parts II–III. 
301. Supra Part IV.A.1. 
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V. Overcoming Fragmentation 
I propose a two-part solution to transcend the problems caused by 
environment-framing. The problems include legal inconsistency in the 
construction of environments in which individuals’ impairments are 
assessed; the undermining of disability claims; and fragmentation, the 
disjunction between the human experience of disability and the legally 
recognized one. First, courts should adopt broad frames for both the 
eligibility and remedy stages of disability analysis. Courts should assess 
individuals in a broad environment that includes workplace, home, and 
other daily environments. Second, courts should interpret an individual’s 
ability to function in a holistic manner by considering her ability to function 
across various civic and social environments. This approach will expose 
barriers to accessibility and allow more meaningful accommodation or 
other modification. The ability to function in some portion of a broad 
environment must not undermine disability status, however, as it does 
currently in ADA jurisprudence.302 
Ironically, Social Security disability benefits cases, which are 
maligned for the restrictive definition of disability they impose, provide 
insight into a mechanism for defining and assessing environment-frames for 
disability status.303  Eligibility for Social Security disability benefits is 
determined according to a holistic view of an individual’s ability to 
function across all relevant environments.304  The aggregate effect of 
impairments is viewed across these environments.305  Social Security cases 
emphasize the importance of adopting a broad environment-frame to gain a 
complete picture of an individual’s ability to function in society. To view 
the environment-frame in any other way, as the ADA eligibility and remedy 
302. Supra Part II. 
303. The Social Security Act employs a more restrictive definition of disability than the 
ADA, yet individuals may be viewed as disabled under the Social Security Act and not the 
ADA. See Grizzle v. Macon Cnty., Ga., No. 5:08-CV-164, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73769, 
at *27 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 20, 2009) (holding that an individual with bi-polar disorder receiving 
Social Security benefits for impairments that included that disorder did not qualify as 
disabled under the ADA). In some jurisdictions, receipt of Social Security benefits is 
evidence of disability for purposes of the ADA, though not dispositive. Moore v. Wal-Mart 
Stores E., L.P., No. 7:07-CV-193 (HL), 2009 WL 3109823, at *8 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 23, 2009). 
In Moore, the Social Security Administration recognized the claimant as disabled, even 
employing an extremely broad view of class of jobs including the "national economy," 
"because she is unable to sustain an eight hour work day on a regular and continuing basis." 
Id. at *5. 
304. Infra Part V.A.2. 
305. Infra Part V.A. 
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cases indicate, would distort the human experience of disability by treating 
disability as if it arises in discrete contexts.306  In addition, the Social 
Security cases highlight a method of assessing a broad frame that does not 
punish an individual for functioning, perhaps out of desperation or other 
necessity, in some portion of her daily environment. 
It is important to emphasize that I am concerned with the possibilities 
of the mechanism for defining and assessing environment-frames offered 
by the Social Security Act and supporting regulations and cases. I do not 
intend to overstate the positive results for claimants with respect to this 
approach. The decisions of the Social Security Administration and courts 
do not always honor the spirit of a holistic, aggregative assessment. 
Lawyers who litigate Social Security cases recount times when claimants 
who admitted they could lift a gallon milk jug (8.7 pounds) were deemed 
ineligible for benefits because they were viewed as being able to lift more 
than five pounds repetitively at work.307  My intention is simply to 
emphasize the promise of a method that considers functionality more 
completely for avoiding fragmentation and promoting disability protections. 
A. Social Security Litigation and the "Holistic, Aggregate Look" 
An individual is assessed holistically for disability Social Security 
program eligibility in several ways.308  First, an individual’s functioning is 
306. See Satz, Disability, supra note 233, at 541–50 (introducing my concept of macro-
level fragmentation); Satz, Overcoming Fragmentation, supra note 18 (developing my 
theory of fragmentation and distinguishing between macro- and micro-level fragmentation). 
307. I am grateful to Mark Weber for reminding me of this point. 
308. Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) is paid to individuals with previous 
sufficient payroll contributions. Soc. Sec. Admin., 2010 Red Book, at 13 (2010), available 
at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/redbook/eng/2010%20Red%20Bookpdf.pdf [hereinafter 
Red Book] (noting that to be qualified, individuals must "be ‘insured’ due to contributions 
made to FICA based on" payroll earnings). Monthly support increases with previous 
earnings, though the average estimate for 2009 was $1,064 to each individual per month. 
Soc. Sec. Admin, Fact Sheet Social Security: 2009 Social Security Changes (2008), 
available 	at 	http://www.socialsecurity.gov/pressoffice/factsheets/colafacts2009.pdf.  
Recipients of SSDI are eligible for Medicare. Red Book, supra, at 13. Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) is a means-tested program paying $674 per month for an individual in 
2010. Id. Individuals receiving SSI are eligible for Medicaid. Id. Individuals with 
disabilities may receive both SSDI and SSI benefits, though SSDI benefits are included in 
SSI eligibility calculations. Id. Both SSDI and SSI benefits are predicated on an inability to 
work. Id. at 14. Under the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, 
individuals who return to work may be able to maintain limited health coverage and cash 
payments. Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-  
170, 113 Stat. 1860 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-19 (2006)). Medicare beneficiaries may 
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assessed overall, rather than with respect to individual impairments. 
Second, an individual’s level of impairment is determined by considering 
evidence of functioning at work and in other environments. Third, the 
Social Security Administration employs the "treating-physician rule," 
which requires an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to give greater 
deference to the opinions of treating physicians than to the opinions of non-
treating physicians.309  Treating physicians are considered "likely to be the 
medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture 
of [the claimant’s] medical impairment(s)."310  This Part will focus on the 
first two aspects of Social Security assessment and the broad environment-
frames they entail. The "treating-physician rule" is the product of adopting 
such frames and does not warrant further consideration here. 
1. Assessing Impairments in the Aggregate 
The Social Security Administration uses a five-step sequential 
evaluation process to determine whether an individual is disabled.311  The 
keep their insurance for eight and a half years. Id. § 202. Medicaid coverage may be 
extended or available for purchase. Id. § 201. Generally speaking, cash payments are 
phased out, given sufficient wages. Red Book, supra, at 30. 
309. See Determining Disability & Blindness, 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2) (2010) 
("Generally, we give more weight to opinions from [claimant’s] treating sources . . . ."); see 
also Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009) ("[T]he treating 
physician rule, requires the ALJ to generally give greater deference to the opinions of 
treating physicians than to the opinions of non-treating physicians . . . ."). 
310. Blakley, 581 F.3d at 406 (citing Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 
(6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Determining Disability & Blindness, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) 
(2004))). 
311. Determining Disability & Blindness, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v) (2010). 
Federal appeals courts review whether the ALJ made findings supported by substantial 
evidence and employed proper legal standards in reaching a conclusion. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 405(g) (2006) ("Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social 
Security made after a hearing to which he was a party . . . may obtain a review of such 
decision by a civil action . . . ."); Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001) 
("We will uphold the ALJ’s decision if it is free of legal error and supported by substantial 
evidence."); Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 227 (3d Cir. 1999) ("The role of this Court is 
identical to that of the District Court, namely to determine whether there is substantial 
evidence to support the Commissioner’s decision."); Andrade v. Sec’y of Health & Human 
Servs., 985 F.2d 1045, 1047 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Our review of the Secretary’s decision is 
limited to whether his findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and 
whether he applied the correct legal standards." (citations omitted)); Brainard v. Sec’y of 
Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989) ("Judicial review of the 
Secretary’s decision is limited to determining whether the Secretary’s findings are supported 
by substantial evidence and whether the Secretary employed the proper legal standards in 
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Social Security Administration assesses impairments in the aggregate to 
provide a more holistic view of a person’s functioning across 
environments.312  An ALJ first determines: (1) whether the claimant is 
engaged in substantial gainful employment activity,313  (2) has a medically 
severe impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits 
her ability to perform basic work activities,314  and (3) has an impairment 
that is the same as, or equivalent to, a listed impairment.315  The ALJ 
assesses "severe impairment" by considering an individual’s overall ability 
to function or "the combined effect of all of the individual’s impairments 
without regard to whether any such impairment, if considered separately, 
would be of such severity."316  If these three criteria are met, the individual 
is considered disabled. 
When the impairment at stake is not a listed one, an individual must 
prove (4) an inability to perform past relevant work.317  If such impairment 
is established, the burden shifts to the Agency to establish that the claimant 
retains sufficient (5) residual functional capacity to permit her to engage in 
other substantial gainful employment.318  Residual functional capacity 
measures a claimant’s highest sustainable level of functioning in a work 
setting.319 
When determining disability eligibility, the Social Security 
Administration and courts broadly assess an individual’s functioning within 
relevant environments. The Administration considers the extent to which 
one’s capability to work is diminished because of environmental 
reaching her conclusion."); Rodriguez v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 647 F.2d 218, 
222 (1st Cir. 1981) ("The Social Security Act specifically mandates that ‘[t]he findings of 
the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.’" 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970))). 
312. Determining Disability & Blindness, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v) (2010). 
313. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). 
314. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). The "ability to do basic work activities" is defined as "the 
abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs." Id. § 404.1521(b). 
315. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). 
316. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B) (2006); see also Webb v. Barnhart, 
433 F.3d 683, 688 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing this method of assessment). 
317. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). 
318. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). 
319. See id. § 404.1545 ("Your residual functional capacity is the most you can still do 
despite your limitations."). RFC is also measured at step (4), though if an individual is 
unable to perform past relevant work her claim will proceed to step (5). See id. 
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) ("At the fourth step, we consider our assessment of your residual 
functional capacity and your past relevant work. If you can still do your past relevant work, 
we will find that you are not disabled."). 
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limitations.320  Both a claimant’s "subjective symptoms" and "objective 
321 medical evidence" are considered. Courts have almost uniformly agreed 
that the ability to work within the Social Security context means "the ability 
to perform the requisite physical acts day in and day out, in the sometimes 
competitive and stressful conditions in which real people work in the real 
world."322  Being able to work requires physical labor as well as 
"substantial capacity, steady attendance, and psychological stability."323 
In assessing an individual’s residual functional capacity, the Agency or 
reviewing courts consider the aggregate effect of all impairments by 
examining the claimant in different environments and over an extended 
period of time.324  Factors include: (1) daily activities; (2) location, 
duration, frequency, and intensity of pain and other symptoms, (3) factors 
that precipitate or aggravate symptoms, (4) effects of medication, (5) effects 
of treatments other than medication, and (6) any other factors concerning an 
individual’s functional limitations and restrictions.325  Biological as well as 
socially-constructed impairments may be considered.326  Exertion levels at 
work may also be relevant.327 
The regulations regarding mental functional capacity are even more 
specific in noting the need to obtain an aggregate view of an individual’s 
disability. Federal regulations state that the "assessment of [mental] 
functional limitation . . . requires us to consider . . . all relevant evidence to 
obtain a longitudinal picture of [a claimant’s] overall degree of functional 
limitation."328  The regulations further provide that the degree of functional 
limitation is based on "the extent to which . . . impairment(s) interfere[] 
320. Wingo v. Bowen, 852 F.2d 827, 830 (5th Cir. 1988). 
321. Id. 
322. McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1147 (8th Cir. 1982), abrogated on other 
grounds by Forney v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 266 (1998). 
323. Silk v. Astrue, 509 F. Supp. 2d 779, 785 (S.D. Iowa 2007) (citing Rhines v. Harris, 
634 F.3d 1076, 1079 (8th Cir. 1980)). 
324. See Gentle v. Barnhart, 430 F.3d 865, 868 (7th Cir. 2005) (reversing the judgment 
because "the administrative law judge failed to consider [claimant’s] disabilities in 
combination, as the cases require"); see also Gaylor v. Astrue, 292 F. App’x 506, 515–516 
(7th Cir. 2008) (holding that "the ALJ was required to consider [claimant’s] back problems 
and mental impairments together and evaluate their aggregate effect on his ability to work"); 
Wingo, 852 F.2d at 830 ("[T]he ALJ’s mechanical application of the guidelines failed to 
consider the aggregate impact of [plaintiff’s] ailments."). 
325. Glomski v. Massanari, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1083–84 (E.D. Wis. 2001). 
326. Kelly v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 871 F. Supp. 586, 592 (W.D.N.Y. 
1994). 
327. SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996). 
328. Determining Disability & Blindness, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(1) (2010). 
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with [a claimant’s] ability to function independently, appropriately, 
effectively, and on a sustained basis."329  This determination is made based 
on such factors as overall functional performance, episodic limitations, the 
amount of supervision or assistance required, and the settings in which the 
claimant is able to function.330  The four broad areas in which mental 
functional limitations are measured are: (1) activities of daily living; 
(2) social functioning; (3) concentration, persistence, and pace; and 
(4) episodes of decompensation (i.e., temporary increases in symptoms 
followed by loss of functioning).331  
2. Considering Multiple Environments 
The focus on "daily activities" with respect to residual functional 
capacity and the "longitudinal look" for mental disabilities requires that the 
Social Security Administration assess individuals at work as well as in 
other environments to determine whether they are employable.332  An ALJ’s 
decision may in fact be overturned, if a claimant’s functionality is only 
assessed in her work environment.333  Unlike ADA jurisprudence, however, 
courts assessing Social Security claims have cautioned against ALJs 
"giving undue evidentiary weight to a claimant’s ability to carry out 
activities incident to day-to-day living when evaluating [that individual’s] 
ability to perform full-time work."334  Judges considering Social Security 
claims must consider the frequency and independence of activities 
performed by the claimant, and her ability to sustain these activities over a 
period of time.335  As the Ninth Circuit has held, "daily activities may 
discredit a claimant only where they constitute a ‘substantial part’ of her 
day and are transferable to a work setting, and the mere performance of 
329. Id. § 404.1520a(c)(2). 
330. Id. 
331. Id. § 404.1520a(c)(3). 
332. See id. § 404.1520a(c)(3)–(4) (noting that the assessment of functional limitation 
is a "complex and highly individualized process," which includes evaluation of "the settings 
in which [claimant is] able to function"). 
333. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 1264, 1269 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that 
the failure of the ALJ to consider claimant’s assertion that she could not drive, read, do 
math, cook, or prepare meals resulted in an evaluation that did not consider "all relevant 
evidence to obtain a longitudinal picture of the [claimant’s overall] degree of functional 
limitation" (citations omitted)). 
334. Reed v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 917, 923 (8th Cir. 2005). 
335. Id. 
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certain daily activities does not in any way detract from her credibility as to 
her overall disability."336 
Courts have held in a number of contexts that the ability of a claimant 
to function in some part of a broad environment does not render her 
ineligible for Social Security disability benefits.337  Claimants who are able 
to function at home,338  at medical facilities,339  at schools,340  or in the 
broader social realm341  may be viewed as disabled for Social Security 
purposes. Numerous courts have recognized undertaking tasks at home 
does not necessarily transfer to a work environment.342  Time and other 
336. Woolsey-Crandall v. Astrue, 258 F. App’x 147, 148–49 (9th Cir. 2007). 
337. See Hennen v. Astrue, 257 F. App’x 21, 22 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that the ALJ 
failed to establish a relationship between claimant’s activity at a local bar and his alleged 
disabilities). 
338. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 n.7 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that the ALJ 
may "reject a claimant’s symptom testimony if the claimant is able to spend a substantial 
part of her day performing household chores," but further noting that this line of reasoning 
has its limits); see also Ford v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding that 
claimant’s activities of "washing a few dishes, ironing one or two pieces of clothing, making 
three or four meals each week, and reading" were not inconsistent with her disability claim); 
Gaylor v. Astrue, 292 F. App’x 506, 513 (7th Cir. 2008) ("[I]t is a deficient analysis to 
assume that a claimant’s ability to care for personal needs and the needs of his or her 
children is synonymous with an ability to be gainfully employed."); Murphy v. Sec’y of 
Health & Human Servs., 872 F. Supp. 1153, 1159 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) ("The fact that plaintiff 
could read and watch television and movies also does not necessarily support the ALJ’s 
conclusion that plaintiff was capable of sedentary work."). 
339. See Genier v. Astrue, 298 F. App’x 105, 106, 108 (2d Cir. 2008) (vacating the 
ALJ’s finding that claimant’s functional assessment by a "consultative doctor" revealed that 
she was only "moderately limited"); Cox v. Barnhart, 345 F.3d 606, 610 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(noting that a single medical evaluation does "not constitute substantial evidence on which 
the ALJ can permissibly base his decision"); Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (finding that claimant’s ability to participate in physical therapy and exercise did 
not support a finding that she could perform past relevant work) . 
340. See Cohen v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 964 F.2d 524, 530 (6th Cir. 1992) 
(noting that attending school is not as demanding as full-time remunerative work because 
classroom hours are less strenuous, and a student can miss class without penalty as well as 
complete homework on her own schedule); see also Parish v. Califano, 642 F.2d 188, 192 
(6th Cir. 1981) ("[The] ability to attend school on such part-time basis . . . does not establish 
an ability to be engaged in substantial gainful activity."). 
341. See Haulot v. Astrue, 290 F. App’x 53, 55 (9th Cir. 2008) ("The fact that 
[claimant] drove short distances every four or five weeks [and engaged in other daily tasks] 
does not support the conclusion that he can work eight hours a day, five days a week, on a 
consistent basis."); Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 303 F. App’x 565, 566 (9th Cir. 2008) 
("Evidence that [claimant] occasionally drove to Phoenix, took a vacation to Hawaii, and 
sometimes found the energy to go grocery shopping are not clear and convincing evidence 
that the claimant led a life that is not compatible with disabling pain and limitations."). 
342. See, e.g., Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 n.7 ("[M]any home activities may not be easily 
transferable to a work environment where it might be impossible to rest periodically or take 
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pressures differ at home and in the workplace.343  Further, the ability to 
complete light housework does not mean that an individual possesses the 
functional capacity to work.344  Caring for one’s children, for example, may 
be the product of desperation to retain custody, not actual functionality: "A 
person can be totally disabled for purposes of entitlement to social security 
[sic] benefits even if, because of . . . circumstances of desperation, he is in 
fact working."345  In addition, courts have held that evidence of the ability 
to perform ordinary life activities is relevant to disability assessment only if 
it is inconsistent with a claimed disability.346 
Courts are also hesitant to equate performing tasks under the 
supervision of a health care professional with the ability to work full-time. 
medication."); Ford, 518 F.3d at 983 ("We . . . believe that the ALJ erred in concluding that 
Ms. Ford’s description of her daily activities worked against her. . . . [D]o[ing] such things 
as washing a few dishes, ironing one or two pieces of clothing, making three or four meals 
each week, and reading . . . are [not] inconsistent with her . . . contention that she is unable 
to hold a full time job."); Gaylor, 292 F. App’x at 513 ("[I]t is a deficient analysis to assume 
that a claimant’s ability to care for personal needs and the needs of his or her children is 
synonymous with an ability to be gainfully employed."); Murphy, 872 F. Supp. at 1159 
(finding that claimant’s ability to read and watch television and movies did "not necessarily 
support the ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff was capable of sedentary work," which involves 
activities for a sustained period). 
343. See Mendez v. Barnhart, 439 F.3d 360, 362 (7th Cir. 2006) ("The pressures, the 
nature of the work, flexibility in the use of time, and other aspects of the working 
environment as well, often differ dramatically between home and office or factory or other 
place of paid work."). 
344. See, e.g., Gaylor v. Astrue, 292 F. App’x 506, 513 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that 
claimant’s ability to care for her own needs and those of her children did not demonstrate the 
capability for gainful employment); Ford v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 979, 981 (8th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that claimant’s ability to wash dishes, iron clothes, and make several meals a week 
did not show that she could work); Wagner v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 842, 851 (8th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that claimant’s ability to cook, clean, and enjoy a hobby at home did not constitute 
substantial evidence of the capacity for gainful employment); Swope v. Barnhart, 436 F.3d 
1023, 1026 n.4 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting that claimant’s ability to perform light housework and 
visit friends did not indicate the capacity for work); Murphy v. Sec’y of Health & Human 
Servs., 872 F. Supp. 1153, 1159 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that claimant’s ability to read 
and watch television did not prove that he can perform sedentary work); Gentle v. Barnhart, 
430 F.3d 865, 867 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that claimant’s ability to perform housework and 
take care of an infant was not the same as the ability to work in the labor market); Salts v. 
Sullivan, 958 F.2d 840, 846 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding that claimant’s ability to take care of a 
garden, mow a lawn, build model cars, play cards, and drive did not disprove disability). 
345. Gentle v. Barnhart, 430 F.3d 865, 867 (7th Cir. 2005). 
346. See Burrow v. Barnhart, 224 F. App’x 613, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
claimant’s ability to attend church and perform some housework with assistance was not 
relevant to demonstrating severe fatigue and chronic pain); see also, e.g., Castillo v. Astrue, 
310 F. App’x 94, 97 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the ability to prepare meals, shop, and ride 
a bike was not relevant to assessing a psychological disability). 
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A number of courts have held that a claimant’s ability to perform an 
isolated task while being examined by a doctor does not indicate the ability 
to be hired and to retain a job that involves performing that task.347 
Similarly, a single medical evaluation does not provide sufficient evidence 
of disability.348  Further, the fact that a claimant performs certain physical 
activities as part of medical treatment does not mean that she could engage 
in similar activities outside that context.349 
At least one court has held that "‘attending college on a part-time basis 
is not the equivalent of being able to engage in substantial gainful activity’" 
because school is often less demanding than working.350  Student absences 
do not have the same implications as employee absences, since employees 
must often perform work on a more rigid schedule.351  
The ability to access the broader social realm through driving may 
not be evidence of the capability to work either.352  One court noted that 
347. See Genier v. Astrue, 298 F. App’x 105, 106 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that claimant 
who had the physical ability to watch a surveillance monitor was disabled because he had 
difficulty concentrating, making quick judgments, and understanding emergency situations); 
see also Ingram v. Chater, 107 F.3d 598, 604 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that "the ability 
merely to lift weights occasionally in a doctor’s office" is not the same as residual functional 
capacity); Wingo v. Bowen, 852 F.2d 827, 831 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he fact that [claimant] 
may be able to inspect a pencil or lace a football does not necessarily mean that she can 
function as a pencil inspector or hand-lacer. The Secretary’s determination that she can 
perform these jobs is mere speculation." (citations omitted)); McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 
1138, 1147 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that an individual should be assessed according to her 
"ability to perform the requisite physical acts day in and day out"), abrogated on other 
grounds by Forney v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 266 (1998). 
348. See, e.g., Cox v. Barnhart, 345 F.3d 606, 610 (8th Cir. 2003) ("We have stated 
many times that the results of a one-time medical evaluation do not constitute substantial 
evidence on which the ALJ can permissibly base his decision."). 
349. See Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001) ("A patient may do 
[physical] activities despite pain for therapeutic reasons, but that does not mean she could 
concentrate on work despite the pain or could engage in similar activity for a longer period 
given the pain involved."). 
350. Cohen v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 964 F.2d 524, 530 (6th Cir. 1992) 
(quoting Parish v. Califano, 642 F.2d 188, 191 (6th Cir. 1981)). 
351. See Parish, 642 F.2d at 192 ("[O]ne may miss occasional classes without penalty, 
and homework may be scheduled for those times when the student feels his or her best."). 
But see Long v. Chater, 108 F.3d 185, 188 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that plaintiff’s claim of 
impairment in reading and writing was contradicted by her making the dean’s list at her 
community college). 
352. See Haulot v. Astrue, 290 F. App’x 53, 55 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that claimant’s 
ability to drive short distances every four or five weeks did not indicate claimant was able to 
work full time); see also Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 303 F. App’x 565, 566 (9th Cir. 
2008) (referring to claimant’s activities, including driving occasionally, as "sporadic and 
punctuated" and finding that such activities could be consistent with disability). 
248 	 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 187 (2011) 
the fact that a claimant drove short distances every few weeks and 
sporadically performed household chores did not "support the ALJ’s 
conclusion that he could work eight hours a day, five days a week, on a 
consistent basis."353  Similarly, evidence that a claimant occasionally 
drove to another city, resting along the way, did not discredit her 
testimony that she had disabling pain.354 
Courts may even question the functionality of individuals who are 
employed.355  Some courts have held that actual employment is not 
concrete evidence of an ability to work. According to these courts, 
disabled individuals may hold jobs out of necessity that tax their 
capacities.356  Additionally, individuals working under "special 
conditions"—such as employment based on "a family relationship, past 
association with [their] employer, or [due to their] employer’s concern 
for [their] welfare”—may not be considered gainfully employed under 
the regulations supporting the Social Security Act.357 
Individuals may not be viewed as disabled, however, if they are 
able to perform work-related tasks in a number of situations within their 
daily environments.358  For example, the Eighth Circuit in Qualls v. 
353. Haulot, 290 F. App’x at 55. 
354. Wilson, 303 F. App’x at 566. But see Morton v. Shalala, 943 F. Supp. 1170, 1174 
(W.D. Mo. 1996) (finding that claimant who drove 475 miles without stopping or taking 
medication did not have a credible complaint of disabling back pain). 
355. See Miller v. Chater, 99 F.3d 972, 977–78 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding that claimant’s 
brief employment did not undermine his disability status). 
356. See Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 2004) ("Having a job is not 
necessarily inconsistent with a claim of disability; the claimant ‘may have a careless or 
indulgent employer or be working beyond his capacity out of desperation.’" (quoting 
Henderson v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 434, 435 (7th Cir. 2003)); see also Gentle v. Barnhart, 430 
F.3d 865, 867 (7th Cir. 2005) ("A person can be totally disabled for purposes of entitlement 
to social security benefits even if . . . he is in fact working."); Wilcox v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 
272, 277 (6th Cir.1990) ("[Claimant] should not be penalized because he had the courage 
and determination to continue working despite his disabling condition."); Simms v. 
Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 321, 327 (M.D. Fla.1974) ("[Plaintiff] should not be penalized for 
her perseverance and courage in seeking to overcome her disability."). 
357. Determining Disability & Blindness, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1573(c)(6) (2010). 
358. See, e.g., Heston v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 536 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that claimant who walked around her yard for exercise, rode an exercise bicycle, 
attended church, vacationed, cooked, vacuumed, and made beds was not disabled); Cruze v. 
Chater, 85 F.3d 1320, 1325 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that claimant who cared for a number of 
farm animals, drove three hours to town weekly, and exercised on a treadmill was not 
disabled); Smith v. Shalala, 987 F.2d 1371, 1374–75 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that claimant 
who drove his children to school, visited relatives and friends, picked up mail from the post 
office, attended church, sang for two hours at a time, and delivered sermons each week was 
not disabled). 
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Apfel,359  held that the plaintiff who claimed to suffer from disabling pain 
and fatigue could perform work as a real estate agent because she "read, 
watch[ed] television, [made] crafts, rais[ed] flowers, visit[ed] her parents 
regularly, attend[ed] church twice a week, [drove], attend[ed] to personal 
business, [laundered clothes, shopped for groceries, and took] care of her 
grandchildren."360  In a more recent case, the same court upheld an ALJ’s 
finding that an individual was not disabled because of her ability to perform 
"an array" of work-related activities in a number of environments.361  
The absence of medical restrictions may allow an inference of the 
capacity for gainful employment as well. One court found that an ALJ 
correctly determined that a claimant was not disabled because his doctors 
failed to limit his physical activities and encouraged him to return to work, 
and he "care[d] for his three daughters, perform[ed] household chores, cut 
the grass . . . and walk[ed] up to six blocks at a time."362  Additionally, 
when a claimant’s daily life activities contradict her view of her own 
impairment, courts may use lack of medical findings to establish 
functionality at work.363  The same is true if a claimant does not seek 
regular treatment or take medication, yet complains of a medical 
condition.364 
Thus, under the Social Security Act, an individual’s impairments are 
assessed holistically and in the aggregate across daily environments. 
However, courts consider a claimant gainfully employable and ineligible 
for disability benefits only when she is able to function in a number of 
different environments and to perform frequent tasks that are transferrable 
to the workplace. Claimants are not penalized for being able to function in 
one portion of a broad environment. 
359. See generally Qualls v. Apfel, 158 F.3d 425 (8th Cir. 1998). 
360. Id. at 427. 
361. See Clevenger v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 567 F.3d 971, 976 (8th Cir. 2009) ("[Claimant 
who alleged "disabling pain" could] do[] laundry, wash[] dishes, chang[e] sheets, iron[], 
prepar[e] meals, driv[e], attend[] church, and visit[] friends and relatives."). 
362. Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 565 (5th Cir. 1995). 
363. See Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 179–80 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiff 
with no clinical or laboratory reports could not substantiate his claim of disabling pain). 
364. See Novotny v. Chater, 72 F.3d 669, 671 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding that plaintiff who 
did not seek medical attention but who carried out garbage and drove his wife to and from 
work failed to establish he was suffering from disabling pain). 
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B. Environment-Framing for Protected Class and Remedy 
Social Security disability cases highlight the importance of 
environment-framing for judicial outcomes. The environment in which 
disability is assessed may be as, if not more, important than how disability 
is defined. Despite a restrictive definition of "disability," broad frames 
often result in courts granting plaintiffs disability status in Social Security 
cases. By contrast, broad frames and a more inclusive definition of 
"disability" result in courts denying plaintiffs disability eligibility under the 
ADA. In order to give force to the ADA and to address fragmentation, 
courts must alter the way in which environments are framed and assessed. 
Social Security cases should inform environment-framing under the 
ADA, in terms of scope and method of assessment. The first step is for 
courts to consistently use broad environment-frames for disability eligibility 
and remedy purposes. A broad environment-frame enables a more 
meaningful and realistic assessment of an individual’s functional capacities. 
Individuals function across numerous environments in a given day; 
disability does not begin and end based on statutorily-protected contexts. 
Assessing functional impairment under a narrow environment-frame 
fragments the human experience of disability by creating a disjunction 
between the lived and legally recognized aspects of disability. It also 
undermines injunctive relief. Drawing environment-frames broadly allows 
for more meaningful access to statutorily protected environments, i.e., 
workplaces, transportation, and places of public service and 
accommodation. 
The second step entails a different method of assessment of broad 
environment-frames. Under the ADA, many courts currently apply broad 
frames to the disability threshold test and deny class eligibility when an 
individual is perceived as functioning in some portion of the large 
environment.365  The concept of aggregate impairments from Social 
Security litigation is useful at this juncture. While the ADA does not 
consider impairments unless they relate to a particular major life activity, a 
litigant could be assessed more holistically with respect to a given major 
life activity.366  This would entail considering impairments that relate to a 
365. Supra Part II. 
366. Under the ADA, plaintiffs are not allowed to demonstrate disability by showing 
they are partially limited in multiple major life activities. Rather, they must prove 
"substantial limitation" in one major life activity. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2006) 
(defining disability as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
major life activities of [an] individual"). By assessing disability in distinct spheres, the ADA 
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major life activity in the aggregate, or across environments, to gain a more 
complete view of the extent of functionality. Disability status would be 
granted, however, unless an individual is able to function throughout many 
or "an array" of her daily environments in a manner relevant to her claimed 
limitation.367  The same holistic assessment would be used to consider 
functionality for purposes of making accommodation or other modification. 
The proposed solution requires judicial rather than legislative change. 
With respect to eligibility, courts would continue to use the same broad 
environment but employ a different method of assessing functioning for 
major life activities. Courts would consider limitations of major life 
activities in the aggregate across daily environments and would not deny 
disability status, unless an individual was able to perform the major life 
activity at stake across a significant number of environments. In the 
remedy context, courts would adopt a different, broader environment-
frame. This would involve an assessment of functioning in a larger 
physical space to allow more meaningful access to the environments 
protected under the ADA. 
VI. Conclusion 
"Environment-framing" may determine judicial outcomes for 
individuals with disabilities. While the ADA does not speak to defining 
environments, it implicitly requires that courts assess environments to 
determine disability eligibility and remedy. This is because measuring 
functioning in these contexts requires an assessment of impairment within 
physical spaces. Typically, courts frame environments broadly for 
disability eligibility purposes. 	Courts usually analyze these broad 
environment-frames in a manner that views individuals who are able to 
function in some part of their environment as without limitation in a major 
life activity and therefore as not legally disabled. At the remedy stage of 
disability analysis, courts often adopt narrow environment-frames. 
Generally, the narrower the environment selected for remedy, the more 
limited the accommodation or other modification. As a result, courts use 
does not account for the fact that different major life activities, e.g., "working" and 
"performing manual tasks," often overlap. Id. Thus, one could argue that the individual 
activity assessment itself provides a fragmented view of an individual’s functional 
capacities, though assessing an individual in a broad environment mitigates that 
fragmentation to some extent. 
367. Clevenger v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 567 F.3d 971, 976 (8th Cir. 2009). 
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environment-frames inconsistently for assessing impairment, and the 
frames they choose undermine disability protections at both stages of 
disability analysis. Environment-framing thus results in fragmentation, or a 
disconnection between the lived and legal experience of disability. An 
individual may experience disability as continuous, but the law affords only 
sporadic (or no) protection. The AAA, which expands the definition of 
"disability," does not resolve these problems. Drawing from the method of 
assessing environments within Social Security disability benefits cases, this 
Article proposes a two-part solution: First, courts should adopt a broad 
environment-frame throughout disability analysis, and, second, individuals 
should be assessed in a more complete or holistic manner that requires 
functioning in a number of environments to deny disability status. 
It is worth pausing at this juncture to consider why courts frame 
environments as they do under the ADA, with trends towards broad frames 
for the disability threshold test and narrow frames for remedy. One 
explanation is that it is simply random, since defining the environment is an 
implied rather than explicit part of established statutory tests. Proof of this 
may be that a minority of federal courts do not frame environments broadly 
for relief purposes. In these and other cases, courts may be guided by 
intuition about whether someone is disabled or should be entitled to a 
remedy. A second explanation, and the one I am inclined to believe, is that 
consciously or subconsciously, courts select environments guided by the 
desire to shield firms from the effects of an unfunded mandate. Given the 
broad definition of disability under the AAA, this highlights the potential 
significance of environment-framing in the decades to come. 
